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ABSTRACT
This article explores new justifications for imposing liability on
underwriters. The article discusses whether civil liability should
be imposed on the leader of a consortium of underwriters (the lead
or, more commonly, managing underwriter) and other underwrit-
ers of initial public offerings (IPOs) for misleading information in
the offering prospectus. The justification of such liability is based
on two new models that simulate the decision-making process of
managing underwriters. The first model indicates that a statute
imposing liability on underwriters plays a crucial role in solving
the problem of hidden action by the managing underwriter, in
which the degree of effort that the managing underwriter makes in
performing due diligence is not revealed in the aftermarket. The
second model shows that the managing underwriter acts strategi-
cally in setting the offering price and in allotting securities to inves-
tors, and that the law plays a central role in reducing the offering-
related costs. This model describes the convergence of supply and
demand in the bookbuilding method.
The principal thesis of the study is that in the current structure
of capital markets, the strategic behavior of the managing under-
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writer of a consortium of underwriters creates substantial costs
through its method of distributing securities in the primary market
and that this phenomenon justifies imposing civil liability on man-
aging underwriters. In the first model, the moral hazard problem
cannot be solved without statutory backing. In the second model,
the managing underwriter cultivates a two-way relationship with
potential investors during the course of marketing the offering. In
this model, the managing underwriter determines the offering
price and the allotment of securities to investors in a way that
maximizes its profits. In equilibrium, only some of the regular in-
vestors perform valuations of the offered securities to the degree
that enables efficiency in building a market-demand curve. The
model indicates that imposing civil liability on the managing un-
derwriter using the bookbuilding method can increase the effi-
ciency of the allotment mechanism operation.
Imposing liability on the managing underwriter is also ex-
pected to put some restraints on its strategic behavior in the after-
market. Another aspect of efficiency that results from imposing li-
ability, is that the managing underwriter's power to effectively
supervise company directors, such as providing oversight of ex-
ecutive hirings and personal interest agreements, is strengthened.
Imposing civil liability on managing underwriters is further justi-
fied by the fact that managing underwriters are the least expensive
insurers, particularly in the distribution of systemic risks.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This article explores new justifications for imposing legal liabil-
ity on managing underwriters. Under prevailing United States
law, the underwriters' of an initial public offering ("IPO") of secu-
rities bear civil liability for damages suffered by investors resulting
from misleading information in the offering prospectus. 2 The un-
1 Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 77b(a)(11), defines
the term "underwriter" as follows:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with,
the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect
participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a
participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such
undertaking; but such term shall not include a person whose interest is
limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of
the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used in
this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer,
any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer,
or any person under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
For a detailed examination of the definition's components, see Louis Loss & JOEL
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 324-40 (5th ed. 2004) (defin-
ing an underwriter) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS]; Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, II
SECURITIES REGULATION, 1138.44-.70 (3rd ed. 1999) (discussing how to determine
whether a particular person is an underwriter) [hereinafter SECURITIES
REGULATION]; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
Vol. I, 131-46 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the underwriting process); Jennifer
O'Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, and the Specter of Liability Under
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 1996 Wis. L. REV. 217, 230-39 (1996) (discuss-
ing the four types of statutory underwriters: (1) persons who purchase with a
view to distribution; (2) persons who offer or sell for an issuer; (3) persons who
purchase from a control person; (4) and persons who participate in the distribu-
tion of a security).
2 In the United States, section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77k
(1997)) is the most popular base for lawsuits against underwriters. In addition to
the underwriter, Section 11 holds the undersigned on registration statements, the
issuing firm, its directors, the experts that have undersigned opinions attached to
the prospectus, and the underwriters all liable under civil law. According to sec-
tion 11(a), they are liable "[i]n case any part of the registration statement, when
such part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or
omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). I will refer to this as
misleading information or a misleading statement. Any buyer of securities in an
IPO or in the secondary market may thus sue for damages due to such misleading
information. In section 11 suits, the plaintiff need not prove reliance on a mislead-
ing statement, the existence of a causal relation, or damages. If the registration
statement contains misleading information, the underwriters, the issuing firm's
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derwriters are subject to a negligence standard and bear the bur-
den of proving that the misleading information in the prospectus
are not the result of their negligence.
The central subject matter of this article seeks to answer to the
following question: based on the economic analysis approach
taken by the law, and more particularly, the economic analysis of
torts, should civil liability be imposed on the managing under-
writer of the consortium of underwriters and the other underwrit-
ers of IPOs for the misleading information in the offering prospec-
tus?
In an IPO, the underwriter3 is a financial intermediary whose
primary roles are to: 1) distribute the offered securities, 2) give
quasi-insurance to the issue, and 3) bridge information gaps be-
tween sellers and buyers in the primary market.4 Usually, under-
writers act as a consortium to fulfill these roles. The crucial work
of the consortium is done by the managing underwriter.5 Before an
directors, and the experts that have undersigned on opinions, but not the issuing
firm itself, are only exempt from section 11(a) liability if they can rely on one of
the defenses outlined in section 11(b). The most important of those will apply if
they show that they have carried out a reasonable investigation and had a reason
to believe, and indeed believed, that no misleading information was included in
the registration statement. This means that the liability standard applied to the
underwriters, the issuing firm's directors, and the experts that have undersigned
opinions is negligence, and that they carry the burden of proof to show that they
have not been negligent. For a general discussion of section 11 liability and its
components, see Loss & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, su-
pra note 1, at 1227-34 (outlining the requirements of a section 11 suit); Loss &
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, vol. IX, supra note 1, at 4247-76 (discussing the
elements of a section 11 action); HAZEN, supra note 1, at 581-618 (describing the
right of action created by section 11).
3 "Underwriting" is an insurance term. In insurance transactions, it means
joining, by means of signing an insurance policy, an insurance obligation by a
consortium of insurers. See THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF MONEY AND
FINANCE Vol.111 721-24 (Peter Newman et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the differences
between underwriting insurance contracts and underwriting new issues).
4 In "firm-commitment" underwriting, a common type of underwriting used
in American IPOs, underwriters perform their roles by purchasing securities from
the issuer in order to distribute them to the public. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613-21 (1984)
(discussing the role of the investment banker).
5 For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the roles that un-
derwriter consortiums and the managing underwriter play, see, JOSEPH AUERBACH
& SAMUEL L. HAYES III, INVESTMENT BANKING AND DILIGENCE: WHAT PRICE
DEREGULATION? 17-21 (1986) (noting efforts to make syndicates larger, simpler,
2006]
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IPO, the issuing firm usually contacts an underwriter who will ul-
timately manage the IPO.6 This underwriter is usually an invest-
ment bank. As IPO manager, the managing underwriter's duties
include advising the issuer, providing investment-banking ser-
vices, including management and financial support for company
activities, assisting in formulating the prospectus, carrying out due
diligence, assessing the value of securities to be sold, determining
the IPOs structure and terms, and creating and managing the secu-
rities' underwriting and distribution networks. The managing un-
derwriter affects an IPO's structure and terms, including the price
of the securities offered, and the information about the offering
disclosed to the public.
7
Civil (and criminal) liability for underwriters for including mis-
leading information in the prospectus can have far-reaching effects
on trading in capital markets. Among other things, underwriters
would charge larger commissions to cover liability costs. This dif-
ference in charged commissions could total a few billion dollars
every year in the various exchanges around the world. Theoreti-
cally, at least, holding them liable might decrease the efficiency of
capital raising, reduce the amount of capital raised, and lead to ir-
regularities in the capital markets' resource allocation mechanism.
8
An extensive review of the regulation of capital markets in the
and faster-acting); Loss & SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION,
supra note 1, at 58-66; Loss & SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at
327-46; HAZEN, supra note 1, at 75-76.
6 See, e.g., HAZEN, supra note 1.
7 See HAZEN supra note 1 (discussing the managing underwriter's crucial role
in the IPO); see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 620 ("The investment
banker's role as an informational and reputational intermediary can dramatically
affect the efficiency of the market's response to an innovative security."); ROBERT
A. SCHWARTZ, RESHAPING THE EQUITY MARKETS: A GUIDE FOR THE 1900S 98-101
(1993) (discussing the roles of investment bankers and underwriters in appraising
and pricing new shares issued in IPOs); ROBERT G. ECCLES & DWIGHT B. CRANE,
DOING DEALS: INVESTMENT BANKS AT WORK 35-52 (1988) (discussing the "network"
nature of investment banking).
8 Arguably, the higher the commission charged by underwriters, the more
they should be held liable, similar to a tax on the primary market. This would
change the allocation of resources by creating incentives to substitute other means
of capital raising and investment, and would shift the distribution of wealth. See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 523-24 (4th ed. 1992) (dis-
cussing how taxation is used to change the allocation of resources and the distri-
bution of wealth).
[Vol. 27:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss2/3
UNDERWRITERS' CIVIL LIABILITY
United States is currently under way. In 1998, the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") publicized its plan for a compre-
hensive reform concerning disclosure with a view to elasticize the
rules and promote public offerings.9 Additional reforms are being
implemented in line with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200210 and in
reference to investigations of biased analyst reports and securities
allocations, particularly with regard to the "hot IPOs" during the
big wave of "hi-tech" offerings from 1999 to March 2001. Despite
the extensive changes in the wake of these reforms, the changes do
not include any reduction in underwriter liability.
As opposed to the approach represented by American law and
legal reforms pertaining to the underwriter-liability regime, the
scientific literature is in dispute over the question of imposing li-
ability on underwriters." The dispute revolves around the under-
standing of how costs are structured in the capital markets, how
the markets operate, and how underwriter functions are identified.
In this article, the main purpose is to explore new justifications for
imposing liability on underwriters.
The main thesis presented here is that the managing under-
writer's strategic behavior and the creation of a consortium of un-
derwriters create substantial costs in allotting securities in the pri-
9 Regulation of Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7606A, Ex-
change Act Release No. 40632A, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-23519A,
63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (proposed Nov. 13, 1998), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/337606a1.txt. This plan includes elasticiz-
ing the rules limiting communication between issuers and potential investors un-
til the actual IPO, and allows for the preparation of various kinds of written pres-
entations for potential investors after filing the registration statement. The plan
also suggests rules to be applied to underwriters. See id., at 67,230-34 (discussing
the role of underwriters).
10 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
11 See discussion infra in Section 2.1. Another question is the appropriate li-
ability standard that should be applied when civil liability is sought against chief
executives and other members of an underwriting consortium for misleading in-
formation in an IPO prospectus. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue, see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Rele-
vant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2004); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S.
CAL. L. REV. 53 (2003); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for
a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001) [hereinafter Barbari-
ans]; Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84
B.U. L. REV. 365 (2004) [hereinafter Strict Liability].
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mary market. This increased cost justifies imposing civil liability
on the managing underwriter and other underwriters for mislead-
ing information found in IPO prospectuses.
Prior models addressed the question of whether imposing civil
liability ignored the strategic behavior of the managing under-
writer and focused instead on other market activity and market
players in examining the operating costs of the mechanism used
for distributing securities in the primary market. (Some justified
imposing liability on the managing underwriter and other under-
writers, while others concluded that imposing civil liability is un-
justified.) One model presented here indicates that a statute im-
posing liability on underwriters plays a crucial role in solving the
problem of hidden action by the managing underwriter, in that the
degree of effort that the managing underwriter makes in perform-
ing due diligence is not revealed in the after-market without statu-
tory backing. Another model suggests that the managing under-
writer acts strategically in setting the offering price and allotting
securities to investors and that the law plays a central role in re-
ducing offering-related costs.
In addition, this study examines the consequences of imposing
liability as it relates to allocating the damages and insuring the risk
of misleading information in the offering prospectus. This study
concludes that a law imposing civil liability on the managing un-
derwriter will cause the managing underwriter to internalize the
risk and insure against it most optimally given the numerous bene-
fits provide by risk insurance.
Using the two models to illustrate the strategic behavior of the
managing underwriter enables a focus on yet another aspect of the
offering procedure and allows the examination of the main proce-
dures used by managing underwriters to distribute securities.
The first model focuses on the procedure for selecting the man-
aging underwriter, for preparation of the prospectus draft by the
company, for performance of due diligence by the managing un-
derwriter, and for doing the offering.12 This model suggests that
the operational strategies of major players and the structure of the
primary market create the complex problem of hidden actions,
none of which are fully resolved by market mechanisms.
12 For a presentation of this model, see discussion infra Section 2.1.
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The first model's thesis is that the existing capital markets
structure creates a problem of hidden actions by firm executives
and the managing underwriter, leading to a moral hazard problem.
This differs from the traditional presentation of the issue in the lit-
erature as an adverse selection problem.13 Under the present
framework, the managing underwriter's strategic behavior and
method of distributing securities in the primary market entails
heavy costs. This phenomenon alone justifies holding both the
managing underwriter and the other underwriters of an IPO liable
for misleading information in the prospectus. I argue that the ex-
isting primary-market problem can also be presented as a moral
hazard problem, and not only as an adverse selection problem.
The first model answers two fundamental questions: (1) why
hiring based on the managing underwriter's reputation alone is not
enough to solve the asymmetric information problem, and (2) how
a law holding the managing underwriter liable solves this problem.
The answer to the first question is that without a law holding
managing underwriters liable, investors cannot know how much
effort the managing underwriter has exerted in performing due
diligence. They cannot review the raw data provided to the man-
aging underwriter by the firm or a record of the managing under-
writer's activities; thus investors are in no position to judge, based
on the securities' performance alone, whether a drop in share value
is due to unrelated causes (such as a business failure by the firm)
or to inadequate disclosure.
A particularly important role is attributed in this model to the
managing underwriter's reputation, which it offers a firm to com-
pensate for investor distrust resulting from their inability to moni-
tor the managing underwriter's activity. Managing underwriters
rely on their reputation to retain and attract clients. If investors
could be convinced that a managing underwriter's reputation
would suffer if it did not put forth its best effort, they would also
believe the underwriter is putting forth its best effort. However,
since investors do not know the causes of share price changes, they
have no reason to believe a managing underwriter's reputation
will change in proportion to the effort it exerts. Therefore, inves-
tors should not believe that a managing underwriter's best efforts
13 Id.
2006)
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will also yield the underwriter the most profits. This is a moral
hazard problem resulting in several potential market equilibriums.
The answer to the second question is that a law requiring opti-
mal managing underwriter effort may facilitate a new, more effi-
cient equilibrium by creating a convention for the managing un-
derwriter's chosen strategy. With no incentive to mislead
investors, the managing underwriter prefers the optimal-effort
equilibrium and the investors can justifiably trust this choice. The
problem is that the managing underwriter cannot convince the in-
vestors that among all possible equilibriums, the one chosen will
actually obtain the best result. Therefore, the managing under-
writer cannot convince the investors to give their trust and to ac-
cept the equilibrium that takes into account the good, accurate in-
formation supplied by the managing underwriter. However, a
social convention regarding the managing underwriter's strategy
may push it to recognize the ideal equilibrium.
The law's role in resolving the hidden action problem is to pro-
vide a credible threat of revealing a managing underwriter's ac-
tions to investors. When the share price drops and the investors
suspect their managing underwriter has not exerted optimal effort,
they may turn to the courts, where the managing underwriter's
behavior can be reviewed. Such judicial review will begin in the
early procedural stages of the legal process; through various dis-
closure requirements, such as document disclosure, the managing
underwriter's modus operandi can be exposed. Additional tools that
can increase investor certainty in their assessment of the managing
underwriter's actions, are the litigation process generally and the
legal decisions rendered in later stages of the legal process.
The model additionally concludes that when the managing un-
derwriter is held legally liable, it is much easier and cheaper to
convince company executives to opt for the proper disclosure
strategy. This is because the law causes the managing underwriter
to put forth effort in conducing due diligence. As a result, it be-
comes unprofitable for executives to opt for a disclosure strategy.
The second model14 presented focuses on the IPO pricing proc-
ess and the way securities are distributed to investors. In this
model, the managing underwriter's strategic actions play a major
14 For a presentation of this model, see discussion infra Section 2.2.
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role in determining the allotment mechanism's efficiency. I argue
that even during the process of interfacing the companies' security
supply and investor demand, the managing underwriter plays an
important role, generating sufficient costs to justify liability.
Unlike previous studies, the present model focuses on the central
players' strategic actions and the gamut of the managing under-
writer functions -insurance, bridging information gaps, marketing
and distribution, and post-IPO market support-which also have
an effect on underwriter actions.15 The model also takes into ac-
count the fact that the issuing process involves information that
flows from the firm to the managing underwriter and investors,
and vice versa.16
The model is based on a single system of selling securities in
the primary market called the bookbuilding method.' 7 In primary
markets around the world, there are two main groups of security
selling mechanisms. The first includes offerings that comply, to a
certain degree, with rules of equality in receiving bids from the
public and distributing them among the various bidders.' 8 This
15 For a description of the various roles underwriters play, see supra text ac-
companying notes 3-5.
16 For a description of the two-way direction of information flow in the IPO's
process, see supra note 4.
17 For a description of the bookbuilding method and its implications, see
Lawrence M. Benveniste & Walid Y. Busaba, Bookbuilding vs. Fixed Price: An
Analysis of Competing Strategies for Marketing IPOs, 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 383 (1997) (discussing the best way to "price and place" IPOs); Law-
rence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer
Price and Allocation of New Issues, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 343, 343 (1989) (concluding that
"by using their access to investors to collect information, underwriters can reduce
IPO underpricing"); Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55
J. OF FIN. 1105, 1105 (2000) (examining "several features of the IPO underwriting
business that result in a market structure where spreads are high"); Francesca
Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding and Strategic Allocation, 56 J. FIN. 2337
(2001) (analyzing the bookbuilding practices of investment bankers); Ann E.
Sherman & Sheridan Titman, Building the IPO Order Book: Underpricing and Par-
ticipation Limits with Costly Information, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2002) (examining the
bookbuiding system for marketing IPOs).
18 For a description of the various methods included in this group and their
implications, see Bhagwan Chowdhry & Ann Sherman, International Differences in
Oversubscription and Underpricing of IPOs, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 359 (1996) (discussing the
implications of oversubscription); Bhagwan Chowdhry & Ann Sherman, The Win-
ner's Curse and International Methods of Allocating Initial Public Offerings, 4 PAC.-
BAsIN FIN. J. 15 (1996) (analyzing investor size); Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 17.
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
group of mechanisms also includes the auction method. The sec-
ond group includes the bookbuilding method, which allows man-
aging underwriter discretion (subject to various legal and conven-
tional rules) in selecting investors to participate in the offering. In
the United States, most IPOs are conducted using this method, and
it is increasingly used in exchanges all over the world.19
The model provides answers to two major questions: 1) how
does the managing underwriter's strategic behavior impact the of-
fering price and the distribution of securities to investors and 2)
how does the law imposing civil liability on the managing under-
writer impact the method of distribution?
In response to the first question, in accordance with the various
changes in the description of the market's structure and manner of
operation, the model shown includes a new description of the way
market equilibrium is determined. At equilibrium, only some of
the regular investors do valuations of the offered securities, ena-
bling efficiency in building a market-demand curve.20 At equilib-
rium, the strategic actions of the managing underwriter achieve
precisely sufficient efficiency in building the demand curve. On
the other hand, such actions allow for the avoidance of the creation
of excessively high costs of examination and information verifica-
tion for investors. The managing underwriter's ability to create an
efficient equilibrium depends on its ability to reward regular inves-
tors by "underpricing" 21 and allotting to them a relatively large
number of shares. Thus, in a particular offering, investors who
19 For a description of the global trend of the bookbuilding method's in-
creased use, a comparison of this method with others including egalitarian rules
(concerning the receipt of bids from the public and their distribution among the
bidders), such as the fixed price method, and a review of the first method's advan-
tages, see, e.g., Tim Loughran, Jay R. Ritter & Kristian Rydqvist, Initial Public Of-
ferings: International Insights, 2 PAc.-BASIN FIN. J. 165 (1994) (discussing the timing
of offerings); Ann E. Sherman, Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building vs. Auc-
tions with Endogenous Entry (Working Paper, December 2004), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRNID644602_code28144.pdf?abst
ractid=276124&mirid=1) (discussing the controversy of bookbuilding in the
United States); Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 17.
20 See infra Section 2.2.
21 The underpricing phenomenon consists of an increase in share value over
the IPO evaluation in the first trading session, after registering for trading on an
exchange. For an explanation of the creation of this phenomenon, see infra, Sec-
tions 2.1.4.3. & 2.2.
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perform a valuation and forward the price data to the company,
are rewarded by the managing underwriter more than investors
who do not do this.
In response to the second question, the discussion indicates
that imposing civil liability on the managing underwriter using the
bookbuilding method can increase the efficiency of method for dis-
tributing securities. Given the statutory rule that imposes civil li-
ability on the managing underwriter, investors can rely on the
company's representations that are provided to them as part of
road shows22 and to decrease the costs of maintaining the system of
examination and the costs of information verification, such as law-
yers' and accountants' fees.
Another conclusion derived from the model is that when liabil-
ity is placed on the managing underwriter, the regular investors'
demand will conform to the higher degree of certainty that exists
when the statutory rule of liability applies. Therefore, the manag-
ing underwriter, who extrapolates the demand curve of the regular
investors and creates the market-demand curve, can calculate a
higher level of demand. This is due to the informed investors' in-
creased demand and to the fact that the extrapolated coefficients
(the multipliers in the move from the demand curve of the regular
investors to the estimated market-demand curve) will be higher.
These factors cause an equilibrium in which a higher price for the
offered securities is attained systematically. This price more pre-
cisely reflects the full estimated value of the offered securities, thus
reducing efficiency loss due to the securities allotment mechanism
in the primary market.
Regarding the law's objective to direct the behavior of the
22 "Road shows" are marketing campaigns conducted after the submission of
the first draft of the prospectus to the SEC. In a road show, representatives of the
consortium director general, together with senior managers of the offering firm,
present the firm to prospective investors and analysts, and receive informal bids
for securities offered in the IPO. This method, common around the world and
necessary to complete the IPO, uses two-way information flow. On one hand, it
provides information about the firm for prospective investors and on the other,
provides pricing information for the managing underwriter. See Loss &
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at 58-66 (pre-
senting a detailed study on informal bids); Benveniste & Spindt, supra note 17, at
349 (explaining the phenomenon of road shows); Sherman, supra note 19, at 1
(clarifying some of the global trends surfacing in the IPO market).
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managing underwriter, another aspect of efficiency that results
from imposing liability is the managing underwriter's strength-
ened power underwriter to effectively supervise the company's di-
rectors. From a welfare distribution perspective, if we accept the
models' conclusions and the analysis presented in this article, it
can reasonably be assumed that the company, the managing un-
derwriter, and the various investors all benefit from the additional
efficiency that results from imposing liability on the managing un-
derwriter.
Regarding the law's objective to distribute damages and risk
(risk-spreading), the discussion will focus on a question, which has
not yet been analyzed in this manner in the scientific literature;
namely whether imposing liability on the managing underwriter
can lead to increased efficiency in the way the system distributes
market risk. This analysis indicates a number of arguments that
justify imposing liability on the managing underwriter, which are
based on the market costs. There are advantages to the law that
imposes civil liability on the managing underwriter that derive
from the managing underwriter being the "least expensive in-
surer," particularly in distributing systemic risks. 23 It appears that
systemic risks and specific risks in the offering prospectus cannot
be completely separated. In such a situation, only the managing
underwriter has the professional know-how, information, and
economies of scale needed to make the separation efficiently and
distributing the risks optimally. This justification contradicts the
argument raised in much of the literature,24 that there is justifica-
tion for waiving underwriter liability, because it is inefficient to
have investors pay an insurance premium for the specific risk asso-
ciated with the offered security.
Furthermore, imposing liability will help resolve problems of
under-insurance and high costs of damages and risk distribution
by way of agreement. It will enable utilization of the managing
underwriter's deep pockets for the purpose of risk diversification
and will exploit the advantages of using a consortium of under-
23 See discussion infra Section 3.1. (presenting this claim and discussing dam-
age distribution and insurance concepts).
24 See discussion infra Section 2.1.1. (discussing the literature of mandatory
disclosure and management oversight).
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writers.
My conclusion is that imposing civil liability on the managing
underwriter is a proper model for action because it effectively re-
duces the managing underwriter's strategic operations costs and
can be expected to redirect the economic welfare.
My research methodology is based on the economic analysis of
a torts law approach, which views the presence of misleading in-
formation in the IPO prospectus as a tortious event, or "accident."
25
The transaction's cost structure is a major feature of this analysis
method. As in the common case of tortious event costs, we are
concerned here with costs associated with a valuable activity (the
IPO transaction) when there is a certain probability for an event to
occur (the presence of misleading information in the prospectus),
whether expectedly or unexpectedly, which will damage the par-
ties and reduce their utility. Furthermore, as opposed to discuss-
ing the issue within the framework of contract law, a tort law dis-
cussion is unique in that the parties to the transaction cannot
negotiate prior to the event, unless at a great cost. Here, there are
many potential investors, most of whom are unfamiliar with the
issuing firms and financial intermediaries. The costs of locating
those investors before the IPO are high. Thus, should the firm and
its underwriters wish to talk to investors prior to registration, they
can only do so at a very high cost. Moreover, the costs of bargain-
ing with the investors are high. Even assuming that a relatively
large proportion of the investors may be located in advance and
convinced to negotiate with the firm and its underwriters, the co-
ordination costs entailed are prohibitively high. An additional cost
factor derives from the need to consider potential buyers of securi-
ties in the secondary market. Adding stipulations to the prospec-
tus referring to selling the securities to investors may reduce the
negotiability of those securities or their IPO price.
25 See POSNER, supra note 8, at 179-235 (outlining an economic-based analysis
of tort recovery). See also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
287-371 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining fundamentals relating to the economics of torts);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
312-16 (1987) (commenting on the fundamental economic framework of tort law),
STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 5-46 (1987) (presenting
the basic theory of liability and deterrence); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1-25 (1980) (comparing the economic implications of
employing a strict liability or a negligence assessment).
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In accordance with the method of economic analysis of tort
law, separate discussion is given to the considerations resulting
from the main objectives of torts law, deterrence (channeling be-
havior) and distribution of risk and damages. These topics are di-
vided into separate discussions on the efficiency and welfare dis-
tribution aspects26 of the questions and, after that, a discussion on
the mix of considerations.
The article is structured as follows: Sections 2, 3, and 4 are de-
voted to the question of directing the managing underwriter's be-
havior. Section 2 presents the two new efficiency-based models
and their implications regarding the utility aspects of directing be-
havior. Section 3 discusses welfare distribution aspects derived
from the analysis offered, concluding that all players may benefit
from holding underwriters liable. Section 4 discusses the combina-
tion of efficiency and welfare distribution considerations. Section 5
discusses various aspect of attaining the objective of distributing
the potential damage resulting from the presence of misleading in-
formation in the IPO. Section 5.1 describes the way damages are
distributed and the insurance system in the primary market (based
on the models presented in the article). I then discuss whether
holding the managing underwriter liable may increase the effi-
ciency of the market damage distribution system. This section
suggests justifications for holding the managing underwriter liable,
based on the fact that the market entails certain costs that require
such liability. Section 5.2 discusses the welfare distribution aspects
of holding the managing underwriter liable within the area of
damage distribution and insurance. Section 5.3 discusses combin-
ing the efficiency and welfare distribution considerations of liabil-
ity in that particular area. Section 6 discusses the tension existing
in this particular case between attaining the objectives of directing
behavior, on the one hand, and distributing damage, on the other.
Section 7 concludes.
26 For presentation of the distinction in economic analysis of law terms be-
tween efficiency, on the one hand, and welfare distribution and distributive jus-
tice aspects and definitions, on the other, see POSNER, supra note 8, at 455-75. See
generally JOHN ARTHUR & WILLIAM H. SHAW, JUSTICE AND ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION
(2d ed. 1991) (discussing different approaches to issues surrounding distributive
justice); JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996) (presenting a
survey of the different theories on distributing justice).
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2. THE QUESTION OF DIRECTING BEHAVIOR: EFFICIENCY ASPECTS
2.1. Model One: A Double Moral Hazard Standard
2.1.1. A review of the literature
The method of arguing the issue of mandatory disclosure and
its enforcement is inspired by the discussion over the question of
management oversight.27 The most common depiction of the costs
of the security allocation mechanism 28 is based on costs resulting
from adverse selection problem (information asymmetry) between
company managers and the investors at large.
29
The literature on underwriter liability is based on that discuss-
ing mandatory disclosure. Again, it usually presents the existing
problem as an adverse selection problem. In our opinion, and as
shown below, the basic problem in the market can also be pre-
27 See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 43-44 (2nd ed. 1997) (describing the debate over mandatory disclo-
sure); John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Dis-
closure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984) (describing the "post-revisionist" phase of
securities regulation literature). In both of the following sources, the authors refer
to the same fundamental articles which inspire the discussion on the regulation of
firm executives: Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976) and Stephen A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in Financial Markets: Implications
of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
177 (F. R. Edwards ed., 1979).
28 Easterbrook and Fischel have presented the standard approach to the issue,
claiming that the stock market creates an inherent asymmetrical information prob-
lem focused on the investors' incapability to identify the type of firm whose secu-
rities are sold on the market, i.e., whether it is of high or low quality. FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
276-314 (1991) (developing further the information problems associated with the
stock market); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692-96 (1984) (describing the problem
created in such a market as one of adverse selection).
29 For a discussion of game theory and the adverse selection problem and an
in-depth analysis of imperfect information in economics, see DAVID M. KREPS, A
COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY (1990) (focusing on adverse selection and
market signaling); IAN MOLHO, THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION: LYING AND
CHEATING IN MARKETS AND ORGANIZATIONS (1997) (presenting important aspects of
imperfect information, adverse selection and moral hazard); ERIC RASMUSEN,
GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY (1989) (introducing
theories on "noncooperative game theory and asymmetric information").
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sented as a hidden actions problem, leading to a moral hazard
problem
As mentioned above, and as opposed to the approach relying
on American law and suggested legal reforms regarding the un-
derwriter liability regime, recent literature questions the effective-
ness of such a regime. On the one hand, many writers found great
benefits in holding underwriters legally liable for various reasons,
including the positive effect of underwriters as reputable interme-
diates30 on the precise pricing of securities31 and on the behavior of
the managements of issuing firms, 32 and in preventing entry of
low-quality firms who mislead investors and present themselves
as high-quality firms.33
On the other hand, some have claimed that it is inefficient to
hold underwriters liable. Thus, Choi described the primary market
as a market with both high- and low-quality firms, financial inter-
mediates, and uninformed investors.34 At the first stage (i.e., the
investment stage), the companies select whether to be high or low
quality. At the second stage (i.e., the IPO stage), the market com-
prises a constant amount of firms of both kinds, and they, in turn,
present themselves as high- or low-quality firms in order to sell
their stock. Since investors cannot distinguish between high- and
low-quality firms, a market equilibrium is reached where, at the
second stage, all firms present themselves as high-quality and the
investors respond by devaluating the securities, while at the first
stage, all firms prefer to be low-quality. In this market, financial
intermediates have the important role of verifying a company's
30 See Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter
Due-Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV 1005, 1008-09 (1984) (examin-
ing whether modem finance theory demonstrates that the information improve-
ment resulting from due diligence produces social benefit).
31 Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release No. 33-6499, 1983 SEC LEXIS 315
(Nov. 17, 1893).
32 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party En-
forcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 60-61 (1986) (examining collateral liabil-
ity and when it should be imposed).
33 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Re-Engineering Corporate Disclosure: The Coming De-
bate Over Company Registration, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1143, 1177-85 (1995) (sur-
veying the degree to which the old order of securities regulation is changing).
34 See Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 919-
20 (1998) (explaining that third-party intermediaries operate in diverse markets
and therefore alternative mechanisms to control fraud must be implemented).
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quality. The higher the verification quality, the greater the compa-
nies' incentive to invest in higher quality. On the other hand, a
higher verification standard involves greater expense (higher
commissions due to higher costs of information verification and le-
gal and accounting costs).
35
Choi claimed that intervening in the market by holding the fi-
nancial intermediates liable can be inefficient and costly for the
IPO market.3 6 In his view, the benefit of barring entry to mislead-
ing, low-quality firms might be overshadowed by the costs, such as
those involved in unnecessary defense required of all market par-
ticipants where the market already provides effective defense, for
example, through the investors' ability to identify product quality.
Choi, therefore, suggested holding the financial intermediates not
liable in the traditional legal sense, and instead suggested imple-
menting a system of self-tailored liability in which underwriters
are able to select their applicable duties out of several alternatives,
including the effective period of binding contractual commitments
to the investors.3
7
The literature has also criticized the previous system of holding
underwriters liable, relying on similar portrayals of the structure
and operation of the primary market. Thus, Partnoy claimed, that
the costs of lawsuits against underwriters are prohibitively high
(ex ante), and that, in many cases, the underwriters fail the exami-
nation.38 Partnoy pointed to the fact that underwriters, acting as
gatekeepers, may prefer to jeopardize their reputation in order to
secure higher short-term profits. The existing legal solution of of-
fering underwriters the defense of due diligence entails high costs
as a result of legal uncertainty, litigation, and other costs resulting
from the fact that the law, due to the centralization it imposed on
underwriters, grants them excessive property rights.39 Partnoy,
35 Id. at 932-33.
36 Id. at 946-49.
37 Id. at 949-66.
38 See Barbarians, supra note 11, at 517-28 (espousing the belief that under-
writers provide some insurance that financial markets will absorb an offering and
that underwriters will stabilize the offering); see also Strict Liability, supra note 11
(focusing on explanations for the accounting and financial reporting irregularities
that arose in 2001-2002).
39 Id.
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therefore, reasons that a different solution should be found - one
not relying on underwriter reputation. He suggested that the un-
derwriter liability regime should be strict liability with an option
for change.40
Other studies discussed the role of "gatekeepers" in the pri-
mary market and the question of holding them legally liable. Some
have pointed to the need of reducing legal intervention in this
area,41 while others have argued for the necessity of such liability,
for various reasons.42
40 See Barbarians, supra note 11, at 491-93, 540-46. The rule would be that un-
derwriters would be held liable for any damages resulting from a legal decision or
settlement holding the issuing company liable to investors. The underwriters will
have the option of changing the rule by agreeing with the company on limiting
the percentages of their involvement in its liability. This will be subject to the
proviso that such a change be stated in the prospectus up to a certain legal mini-
mum (such as the rate of commissions charged or a constant rate between 1% and
5%).
41 See Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securi-
ties Regulation, 98 HARv. L. REV. 747, 755-56 (1985) (claiming that advances in
technology will reshape the economic roles played by broker-dealers and that
these advances will necessitate new securities regulations); see also Donald C.
Langevoort, Toward More Effective Risk Disclosure for Technology-Enhanced Investing,
75 WASH. U. L.Q. 753, 754-54 (1997) (arguing that technological change is nothing
new to the world of finance and therefore the adequacy of risk disclosure re-
quirements under federal securities regulation does not require any deep insight
into technological evolution); Donald C. Langevoort, Deconstructing Section 11:
Public Offering Liability in a Continuous Disclosure Environment, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45, 62-63 (2000) (rethinking civil liability in capital-raising transactions).
See generally Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to
Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (1993)
(addressing whether third-party enforcement actions offer an effective mechanism
for regulating financial intermediaries); Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obliga-
tions of Financial Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REV. 509, 566-67 (1994) (examin-
ing the public debate over the enhanced obligations of holding companies and the
imposition of new legal obligations); Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants:
Is Third-Party Liability Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 296-97 (1988) (arguing
that to hold the accountant liable to third parties would be equivalent to making
him a guarantor against unfortunate events, which would not be in the interest of
the plaintiff class).
42 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Acquiescent Gatekeeper: Reputational Intermediar-
ies, Auditor Independence and the Governance of Accounting 1-62 (Columbia Law Sch.
Pub. Ctr. for Law and Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 191, 2001), available at
http://cegopp.cema.edu.ar/download/TheAcquiescent Gatekeeper.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 3, 2006) (defining the conditions under which gatekeeper liability is
likely to work and to fail); see also Coffee, supra note 27 (positing that gatekeepers
who serve investors respond to self-serving incentives to the detriment of the
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An important study on the evaluation of securities issued by
investment banks was recently conducted by Deloof, De Maese-
neire, and Inghelbrecht.43 Based on data from the Brussels Stock
Exchange ("BXS") for the years 1939-2000, these researchers found
that evaluations of IPOs by the underwriting consortium managers
are based, in each issue, on a variety of value assessment methods.
Some of those are precise (such as the method based on the pre-
dicted net cash flow) while others are systematically biased.44 This
finding suggests that managing underwriters deliberately bias the
offering price, or at least that underpricing takes place despite the
fact that the managing underwriter knows the expected post-IPO
market price. These results support the approach, which stresses
the managing underwriter's strategic behavior in each stage of the
issuing process.
2.1.2. The players, their strategy set, and payoffs
The model presented here does not involve firms of varying
quality, but various levels of misleading descriptions of offered se-
curities. The investors, who estimate that each firm might report
inadequate information at a certain distribution of deception levels,
weigh this information into the price that ought to be paid for the
offered securities. Consequently, the equilibrium stock-market
price will be lower than the price resulting from a situation in
which all parties have complete information (or where the firm can
convince the investors of having provided adequate disclosure
without substantial transaction costs).
The present model differs in its analysis of primary market
structure and mode of operation from the above-mentioned mod-
els. In the present model, the central players in the market act stra-
tegically: the issuing companies can chose how to portray them-
shareholders).
43 See Marc Deloof, Wouter De Maeseneire & Koen Inghelbrecht, The Valua-
tion of IPOs by Investment Banks and the Stock Market: Empirical Evidence 1-32 (Uni-
versiteit Gent: Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde, Working Paper No.
2002/136, 2002) available at http://www.feb.ugent.be/fac/research/WP/Pa-
pers/wp_02136.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2006) (arguing that underwriters con-
sciously under price IPOs by relying on a valuation method that tends to underes-
timate value).
44 Id.
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selves; the managing underwriter can chose the effort they exert in
carrying out due diligence requirements; and investors can chose
the degree of trust they have in the presentations of each issuing
company and managing underwriter and tailor their demands for
the securities offered to the appropriate level of trust.
A primary element of the present model is its conception of the
strategies applied by the issuing companies, the underwriting con-
sortium executives, and the investors, as based on hidden actions
by the participants. This conception takes into account the fact that
the activities of participants in the primary market usually are not
exposed during the secondary trade in company securities. Fur-
thermore, even when various participants in the allocation process
are sued, the uncertainty as to their behavior is often not reduced
at all, due, among other things, to settlements at an early stage of
the legal process.
Another central element of the model is that it translates the
participants' hidden actions problem into a moral hazard problem,
as is customary in game theory literature.45 Based on this litera-
ture, it is justifiable to present the primary-market problem also as
a moral hazard problem (in the present context, as in many other
situations, adverse selection and moral hazard problems coexist).
Kreps clarifies the distinction between the problems as follows: a
moral hazard occurs "where one party to a transaction may under-
take a certain action that (a) affects the other party's valuation of a
transaction but where (b) the second party cannot monitor/enforce
perfectly," while adverse selection occurs "where one party to a
transaction knows things pertaining to the transaction that are
relevant but unknown to the second party."46 The existing prob-
lem in the primary market matches the definition of a moral haz-
ard problem. The main feature of the primary-market problem is
the inability to monitor the actions of the issuing company's execu-
tives, as well as the actions of the managing underwriter.
45 Not every hidden action problem is a moral hazard problem, and vice
versa. For a theoretical illustration of a hidden action problem leading to a moral
hazard problem, see KREPS, supra note 29, at 577-624; RASMUSEN, supra note 29, at
163-222; MOLHO, supra note 29, at 60-184.
46 KREPS, supra note 29, at 57. For a similar definition of moral hazard, see
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 606 (Prentice Hall 5th
ed. 2001) ("In general, moral hazard occurs when a party whose actions are unobserved
affects the probability or magnitude of a payment.").
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2.1.2.1. The players
It is assumed that the issuing firm wishes to sell a given
amount of securities at the highest possible price, in order to maxi-
mize its transaction profits. The firm is risk neutral. It uses a pro-
spectus to provide investors with information about the offered
product.
The firm's real share price (Si) is determined by two parame-
ters: (1) the investor's return expectancy (S i), which is a function
both of the distribution of the firm's chances for success and of its
dividend allocation policy; and (2) the return variance (6 j2), or the
assumption that securities are distributed in a known pattern a
normal distribution (Si - N (S i, 6j2), for example).
The IPO is being prepared right after the company's informal
understandings with the underwriter, based on a letter of intent, in
which the underwriter assesses the company's value. Only later,
after the underwriter has carried out due diligence procedures, is
the price of the offered securities determined. I will assume here
that the managing underwriter's discretion in determining the IPO
price is broad enough to enable a great degree of flexibility (despite
informal promises in the letter of intent). In order to focus in this
section on information gaps between the firm and the managing
underwriter on the one hand, and the investors on the other, I will
also assume that there are no conflicts of interest between the firm
and the managing underwriter in determining the issue price. 47
The actual IPO process begins once the issuing firm has se-
lected its managing underwriter. The managing underwriter is in
a situation where hiring distribution and risk-reduction services
also include hiring reputation. This is because reputation cannot
be separated from the other services provided. The investors know
that the managing underwriter collects and analyzes all informa-
tion required for the transaction with a view to maximize the util-
ity from collecting the information and assessing it minus the col-
lection and assessments costs. The investors realize that this means
the managing underwriter carries out a comprehensive check of in-
47 See, e.g., David P. Baron, A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Ad-
vising and Distribution Services for New Issues, 37 J. FIN. 955, 955-76 (1982) (illustrat-
ing a model where the leader has an interest in underpricing the IPO due to in-
formation gaps and conflicts of interest between the offering firm and the leader).
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formation relevant to evaluating the transaction. Information
about the securities' value and the risk they represent is important
to the managing underwriter in order to estimate the deal and de-
termine its various terms. Should a managing underwriter make a
mistake and overestimate the securities' value, the stock offered
may not sell, and the underwriters may be stuck with overpriced
securities. In this case, when it is realized that the share price is fal-
ling (following information processing by the secondary market),
the managing underwriter's reputation inevitably suffers. Even in
a case where investors realize that the prospectus contains mislead-
ing information and the share price is dropping, loss of reputation
naturally ensues.
Underwriters know that their ability to do business with com-
panies in the future depends on their past successes. Their reputa-
tion is highly sensitive to failure in selling issued stock and to mis-
takes in collecting and assessing information. In addition to
closing the deal and maximizing profits, the underwriters wish
mainly to create as good a reputation as possible. For my purposes
here, I will also assume that the underwriters act as objective in-
termediates.
In the suggested model, underwriters select the price of securi-
ties offered to the public. Their selection is based on data provided
by the firm - and double-checked by them - and is later conveyed
to investors through the draft prospectus. The investors' response
in evaluating the real price of the offered securities is then the final
basis for the managing underwriter's estimate of the expected real
price.
The investors all have identical (and partial) information about
the distribution of the firm's value, mainly based on the partial in-
formation in the prospectus. The investors decide whether to be-
lieve the issuing company's statement that all relevant information
has indeed been credibly provided. Based on this data, the inves-
tors assess the real share price (Si). The investors are also risk neu-
tral.
Note that the investors cannot tell whether the managing un-
derwriter has received the relevant information, analyzed it, as-
sessed it professionally, and presented it accurately in the draft
prospectus.
2.1.2.2. The players' strategy set
The issuing firm has the following two options: (1) disclose all
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the information in the prospectus and provide the underwriter
with all additional, relevant information, such as secret informa-
tion, five-year plans, project assessments, etc. ("disclosure (d)"); or
(2) provide misleading information in the prospectus or to the un-
derwriter ("nondisclosure (f)"). The firm formulates the draft pro-
spectus and hands it over to the managing underwriter, together
with raw data. Having received the information, the managing
underwriter checks and assesses it. Due to third-party effects of
publishing the information, the information conveyed to the un-
derwriter also includes raw data not reflected in the prospectus.
Not knowing which option the firm has chosen, the managing
underwriter must choose a level of effort to apply to its due dili-
gence duties. The underwriter and the company know this level,
but the investors do not. Should a managing underwriter opt for a
low level of effort (al), the model assumes it will not identify in-
adequate disclosure.48 If it chooses optimal effort (a2), the model
assumes it will identify inadequate disclosure and amend it. A
managing underwriter exerting more effort (a3) achieves the same
degree of effectiveness as with the lower effort level. The manag-
ing underwriter's IPO cost includes due diligence costs, which are
directly proportional to its effort, losses due to the purchase of un-
sold stock, and costs of manipulating the post-IPO market, which
depend on its success, and last, but not least, its distribution costs.
Not knowing what course was taken by the company and what
effort was exerted by the managing underwriter, the investors
have to decide whether to believe the company's presentations in-
cluded in the prospectus, which is published without security
prices ("option y") or not to believe them ("option n"). In addition,
such investors have beliefs regarding the managing underwriter's
course of action. These beliefs depend on the managing under-
writer's reputation, which is dependent, in turn, on past successes.
In this context, success means succeeding in previous primary
48 1 assume here that the firm does not opt for nondisclosure at a level per-
ceived by the investors and the leader as serious fraud, which necessarily means
losing its business. The model could be expanded to include an action where the
firm makes serious nondisclosures and the managing underwrite reacts by sever-
ing all contact with the firm because of a fear that this would come to the inves-
tors' knowledge and lead to a failed IPO (in addition to serious damage to the
managing underwriter's own reputation).
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market offerings to make the IPO price reflect disclosure by the is-
suing firms, both in the prospectus and of secret information di-
vulged to the underwriter alone.
The managing underwriter concentrates on the investors' de-
mand data, not knowing whether or not the investors have chosen
to believe the firm. In the event that the managing underwriter
chooses the low effort level, it doesn't know whether the firm has
opted for disclosure or nondisclosure. The managing underwriter,
an objective and unbiased intermediary, decides on the price that
the securities are to be offered to the public. This price reflects
supply and demand data, as studied by the managing underwriter.
Not knowing the course selected by the firm and the degree of ef-
fort exerted by the managing underwriter, the investor has a pre-
sumption concerning how the managing underwriter acts. This
presumption or belief depends on the managing underwriter's
reputation, which is dependent on past success. Success means
that in previous primary market offerings, the managing under-
writer managed to make the IPO price reflect disclosure by the is-
suing firms, both in the prospectus and regarding confidential in-
formation divulged only to the underwriter.
Based on this information, the investor has a particular belief
concerning the managing underwriter's behavior, which is, in turn,
dependent on the managing underwriter's reputation at that point
in time (Mo). The investor assigns a certain probability to the like-
lihood that the managing underwriter will perform due diligence
at an optimal effort level. I assume that this probability is equal to
the managing underwriter's reputation (p(a2) = Mo). The investor
also believes that there is some probability that the managing un-
derwriter will exert minimal effort. Since he doesn't believe the
managing underwriter would exert an effort level higher than op-
timal, I conclude that the probability, as perceived by the investor,
of the managing underwriter to exerting minimal effort is: p(ai) =
1 - p(a2) - p(a3) = 1 - MO.
2.1.2.3. The payoffs
In the model, the main utility for the managing underwriter is
an increase in reputation (Mo < M1). The managing underwriter's
reputation changes according to investors' estimates of its success
rate, information they usually cannot assess with certainty. The
investors base their assessment on information gathered before the
IPO, information about the managing underwriter's behavior dur-
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ing the IPO (believe - y; disbelieve - n), information about the
company's and the managing underwriter's behavior in the post-
IPO market (findings that confirm indications concerning their
hidden actions), and information about the behavior of securities in
that market (Si). Upon discovery that the prospectus contains mis-
leading information that the managing underwriter should have
identified, the managing underwriter's reputation is damaged. If
information reveals that the company engaged in nondisclosure
and the managing underwriter engaged in suboptimal effort levels,
then the investors respond by monitoring share prices. The
sharper the (non-systematic) price drops, the greater the investors'
certainty that it was related to the nondisclosure. 49 If such impli-
cating information is indeed revealed, the shares will drop more
when investors have previously believed the company and the
managing underwriter's presentations (y). In the opposite case (n),
lower demand leads to lower prices at equilibrium (the equilib-
rium price includes investor expectations that the price does not
reflect all of the relevant information). Correspondingly, the
change in managing underwriter reputation following the IPO is
fully determined only after a certain period of time (Ti). This is re-
quired to gather and process the information concerning the com-
pany's and the managing underwriter's IPO behavior, and the be-
havior of share prices in the post-IPO market. Importantly,
changes in managing underwriter reputation depend on the play-
ers' strategy combination (X), changes in share prices in the post-
IPO market and the investors' ability to identify each player's
strategy set and understand their game play, while the managing
underwriter's decision during the IPO is based on his To informa-
tion about those parameters.
In the present model, the payoffs are the issuing company's
profits, the investors' profits, and the underwriter's reputation
(Mi). Within the players' strategy set, there are four situations in
49 The assumption is that the firm is usually interested in including in its pro-
spectus positive information to maximize the value of its securities. When mis-
leading information is found in the prospectus, security prices rarely rise. This is
also because of the fact that such a finding about the company's executives having
hidden positive information is actually a finding of negative information about
the company's management and a signal to the effect that the company's securi-
ties may have been manipulated.
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which the investor believes the firm's presentations (y):
1) When the company opts for disclosure (d), and the man-
aging underwriter opts for an optimal effort level (a2) or
higher. In this case, the investor pays the real price for
the securities, and both the investor and the company
benefit. This result reflects normal profits by the com-
panies as security "producers" and by the investors as
security "consumers" in a competitive, completely in-
formed market. In this case, the managing underwriter
estimates that its reputation-change expectancy is
maximal. This is because the probability of being cer-
tain that the company failed to disclose, or that the
managing underwriter exerted a low level of effort (al),
is 0, while the probability for the investor to interpret a
post-IPO price drop and information implicating the
company's and the managing underwriter's behavior as
evidence for inadequate disclosure is very low.
2) When the company opts for inadequate disclosure (f)
and the managing underwriter opts for an optimal ef-
fort level (a2) or higher. In this case, the result is identi-
cal for both the investor and the company. The manag-
ing underwriter estimates that its reputation-change
expectancy is close to maximum. This is because there's
a positive probability for revealing findings implicating
the company. There is, therefore, a higher probability
for any price drop to be interpreted by the investors as
evidence for a managing underwriter strategy of low ef-
fort (ai), as opposed to the strategy chosen in practice.
3) When the company opts for disclosure and the manag-
ing underwriter opts for a sub-optimal effort level (al),
the result is identical for both the investor and the com-
pany. The managing underwriter's reputation-change
expectancy is very close to maximum. In this case, the
probability for the managing underwriter to be impli-
cated is higher than in the previous case. There is also a
higher probability for a price drop to be interpreted as
evidence that the managing underwriter has indeed
opted for sub-optimal effort (should these findings be
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revealed, at a given certainty level, simultaneously with
the drop in prices).
4) Lastly, when the company opts for inadequate disclo-
sure (f) and the managing underwriter opts for sub-
optimal effort (al), the managing underwriter expects its
reputation to be severely damaged. In this case, the
probability for price drops is the highest, since the com-
pany has been sold for prices above its real value, and
the same goes for the probability for this price drop to
be interpreted as evidence for sub-optimal effort. Nota-
bly, in this case the investor also suffers the greatest
loss.
In the remaining situations, the investor chooses not to believe
the firm's presentations (n). If the managing underwriter opts for
the optimal effort level (or higher than that), and the investor be-
lieves the firm's presentations, both the firm and the investor bene-
fit from the IPO (normal profits). In this situation, the managing
underwriter estimates that its reputation change expectancy is
close to maximum -when it is in fact lower, because of the consid-
erable probability of suspicious findings against the firm. There-
fore, there is a higher probability for price drops to be interpreted
by investors as implying a low effort strategy by the managing un-
derwriter as opposed to the actual strategy.
If in those same activities by the firm and the investors (non-
disclosure and trusting, respectively), the managing underwriter
exerts the low effort level, the results for the firm and investors will
be different. Investors will be willing to pay a price higher than the
securities' real price, and suffer heavy losses as a result of the price
drop that will inevitably ensue. The firm will profit more than
normal as a result of the investors' misjudgment concerning the se-
curities' true value. The managing underwriter, in turn, will be-
lieve that its reputation change expectancy is at the lowest level. In
this case, the probability of findings against the underwriter is at
its highest (because of both direct findings that the managing un-
derwriter has exerted a low level of effort and the investors' esti-
mation based on findings concerning the firm's behavior). In this
case, there is the highest probability for a price drop, since the is-
sued securities have been sold at prices higher than their real
value, and also the highest probability for such a price drop to be
interpreted by investors as implying the managing underwriter's
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(actual) strategy of opting for the low effort level.
If I now assume that the firm opts for nondisclosure (f), the
managing underwriter opts for the optimal effort level (a2), and the
investors do not believe company presentations (n), the results
from the point of view of the firm and the investors are similar to
those obtained in the parallel situation where the firm opts for dis-
closure (d) and the managing underwriter and investors make the
same choices as in here. In this case, the firm's profits are minimal
(probably zero), while the investors' profits are small (e.g., half the
normal profits). However, as opposed to the parallel case where
the firm opts for disclosure (d), in this case the managing under-
writer estimates a small reputation change expectancy because of
the higher probability for suspicious findings against the firm that
will be interpreted by investors as implying a managing under-
writer strategy of opting for the lower effort level (a,) (as opposed
to the actual strategy).
If, in same situation (i.e., firm opts for nondisclosure (f) and the
investors are non-trusting [n]) the managing underwriter now ex-
erts the low effort level (al), it is reasonable to assume that the
firm's profits will drop or remain unchanged, while the investors'
profits will drop considerably. There is a possibility that the firm
will not suffer, if the investors precisely offset the consequences of
its misleading presentations. The investors will not lose money ini-
tially, but the post-IPO demand may shrink considerably upon dis-
covery of evidence implying, at a specific level of certainty, the
firm's nondisclosure strategy. The expected damage to the manag-
ing underwriter's reputation in this case is medium, since no sig-
nificant correction of the securities' price during the post-IPO trade
is to be expected.
2.1.3. The equilibrium
When the market operates without underwriter involvement,
the issuing firm can opt for a strategy of full disclosure or for a
strategy of providing information which includes misleading in-
formation. The investors, in turn, may choose to believe or disbe-
lieve the firm's prospectus presentations. Since the firm's manage-
rial activity is hidden and may not be revealed in the post-IPO
market, a moral hazard problem is created, leading investors to
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distrust the managers' presentations.50 The result I hoped to
achieve is that the firm will voluntarily opt for disclosure and the
investors will trust it to have done so. This will ensure the most
socially efficient result (normal profits for the firm and the inves-
tors). Instead, I obtain a Nash equilibrium in which the firm opts
for nondisclosure and the investors choose not to trust its presenta-
tions. This is an equilibrium in which both the firm and the inves-
tors lose.
To solve this problem, the market uses the services of a consor-
tium manager contributing its reputation to the task of bridging in-
formation gaps. Moreover, the market chooses to use an under-
writer, in the allocation mechanism, to deal with intermediation
and distribution costs as well as the information gaps. A new
problem is thus created: this managing underwriter's activity also
entails a hidden actions problem. Therefore, hiring a managing
underwriter's reputation services alone does not solve the asym-
metrical information problem. Without a law holding a managing
underwriter liable, the investors cannot know how much effort
managing underwriters have exerted in carrying out due diligence.
They cannot examine the raw data submitted to them by the firm,
have no record of their actions, and cannot judge -based on trade
behavior alone -whether the share-price is dropping due to natu-
ral causes (e.g., business failure of the firm) or to inadequate dis-
closure.
Within the model, the managing underwriter's reputation
plays a particularly important role. It is taken on by the issuing
firm in an effort to overcome the investors' distrust resulting from
their inability to monitor the company's activities. The managing
underwriter relies on reputation in order to retain and expand
business. If the investors could be convinced that the managing
underwriter's reputation would suffer if it did not exert optimal ef-
fort, they would believe the managing underwriter indeed exerts
such an effort. However, since investors do not know the reason
for share-price changes, there is no reason to believe that the man-
aging underwriter's reputation would change in accordance with
its level of effort. These investors have several possible ways to as-
50 For an explanation of the moral hazard problem, see supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text.
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sess the managing underwriter's reputation behavior. One way is
for the managing underwriter's reputation to be dependent on the
benefit it derives from the transaction. Another way is for the
managing underwriter's reputation to be dependent on price
changes, such as price drops, which suggests a low level of effort
by the managing underwriter at a given degree of certainty. Since
the development of reputation as dependent on the various par-
ticipants' behavior in the IPO is unknown, investors cannot be
convinced that it is always worth the managing underwriter's time
to exert optimal effort. This is a managing underwriter moral haz-
ard problem leading to several possible market equilibriums (in-
cluding the efficient equilibrium obtained once the firm adopts an
adequate disclosure strategy, the managing underwriter exerts op-
timal effort, and the investors believe company presentations).
2.1.4. The role of the law
2.1.4.1. The change in the law's effect once the managing
underwriter is added as a player
When the firm and the investors hire the reputation services of
the consortium manager in order to bridge primary-market infor-
mation gaps, several possible equilibriums may result. A law
compelling the managing underwriter to exert optimal effort cre-
ates a social convention as supporting the managing underwriter's
chosen strategy.51 Thus, the managing underwriter has no incen-
tive to mislead investors and, among all possible equilibriums, opts
for the optimal effort and investors believe it. An existing conven-
tion regarding managing underwriter strategy, which may consti-
tute a sufficient condition for preferring a game play, should lead
51 See, KREPS, supra note 29, at 410-13, 449-51 (giving references for a reliable
way of playing based on social convention); see also, Fieke Van der Lecq, Conven-
tions and Institutions in Coordination Problems, 144 DE ECONOMIST 397, 401-10 (1996)
(interpreting coordination problems that occur in an economy with a game-
theoretic approach); H. Peyton Young, The Economics of Convention, 10 J. ECON.
PERsp. 105, 107 (1996) (analyzing the process of forming conventions with an evo-
lutionary "bottom up" model); Hans Van Ees & Harry Garretsen, Existence and
Stability of Conventions and Institutions in a Monetary Economy, 28 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 275, 283-87 (1995) (analyzing conventions and institutions while accounting
for historical contingencies).
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to the desirable equilibrium and to the recognition of this equilib-
rium.
Such a legal role is relatively inexpensive and can also be
played in tandem with the enforcement role. However, where the
main justification for applying a certain legal arrangement is creat-
ing a social convention allowing for definite game play, this may
have important implications in terms of legal simplicity and the
redundancy of elaborate enforcement mechanisms. The model
does not discount the possibility of a legal enforcement role as
well, but rather supports the claim that holding the managing un-
derwriter legally liable may play the crucial role of supporting
market mechanisms by pointing to the desirable equilibrium.
Moreover, should the company and its managers be held liable
instead of the managing underwriter, the latter's services could not
be used together with legal support to create an efficient and inex-
pensive mechanism of credible information transfers. According to
the model, no convention can be created in the manner described
above by holding the company and its managers legally account-
able. The law's enforcement role may indeed be used to compel
them to adopt a disclosure strategy, but the costs of the required
enforcement mechanism would be prohibitively high. It would in-
volve very strong incentives for the company and its managers to
redesign the game such that, when the company opts for an inade-
quate disclosure strategy, it and its managers would be subject to a
fine that would account for the chances of not getting caught, of no
evidence being found, or of an inability to use the evidence to
prove inadequate disclosure.
2.1.4.2. Holding the underwriter liable helps convince the
issuing company to opt for disclosure
Another conclusion derived from the model is that when the
managing underwriter is held liable, it is much easier and cheaper
to convince the firm and its managers to adopt a disclosure strat-
egy. Given the certainty as to the managing underwriter's course
of action (who choose an optimal effort level) and that of the inves-
tors (who trust that disclosure has been ensured by the managing
underwriter's involvement in the IPO), the firm will not benefit
from opting for nondisclosure. In this case, then, relatively weak
incentives, such as reputation or minimal level of enforcement
measures, will suffice to convince the firm and its managers to opt
for a disclosure strategy.
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2.1.4.3. How managing underwriter liability affects the
creation of a reputation-based market mechanism and
underpricing cost
It is certainly possible for a price drop or implicating findings
regarding the company's or the managing underwriter's behavior
to be interpreted by the investors as indicating that the managing
underwriter has chosen to exert sub-optimal effort or has acted
unprofessionally in assessing relevant information. This could
happen despite the fact that the managing underwriter has actually
opted for optimal effort and assessed relevant information profes-
sionally. This contingency gives the managing underwriter an in-
centive to stop acting as an objective intermediate, as modeled
here. The assumption is that the managing underwriter collects
investor demand data on the one hand, and company supply data,
on the other, and that the underwriter is the only one who really
knows them. Given this assumption, the managing underwriter
can determine the IPO price so that it takes into account the possi-
ble risk of reputation damage. This damage may be due to investor
misperception of effort or professionalism. The result is an intent
primary-market share price drop- i.e. underpricing.
The managing underwriter's ability to reduce the price is lim-
ited by several parameters. First, it is limited by its ability to justify
any change relative to the price stated in the letter of intent (the
change cannot be too extreme due to the competition with other
prospective consortium managers). Second, it is limited by the
firm's own information about the security's real price and its bar-
gaining power. And third, it is limited by the effect of any price
change on the existing equilibrium (d,a2,y).
This explanation for the underpricing phenomenon is inconclu-
sive, however. Among the primary-market security distribution
costs, this important cost has been the focus of considerable inter-
est in the literature.5 2 The underpricing phenomenon means that
the share value rises in the first day of trading after having been
initially registered relative to the IPO value. This is a global phe-
52 For a general review of the phenomenon as a global one and of its various
reasons as discussed in the abundant literature, see discussion infra Section 2.2.1.
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nomenon. The reasons for this IPO underpricing effect are not
clear, and many theoretical explanations have been suggested.
5 3
The importance of the present explanation derives from its consid-
eration of the role of the law.
One well-known explanation for underpricing focuses on the
interactions between this phenomenon and the risk of claims
against the issuing firm and the underwriters. Such claims at the
IPO stage are fairly common, and, in the United States, their rate
has been estimated at no less than 5%-6%.54 Accordingly, several
models explain the underpricing phenomenon as deriving from the
company's and the underwriters' defense against the possibility of
being sued due to misleading prospectus details.55 According to
this explanation, riskier issues would be characterized by a higher
rate of underpricing, which acts as a sort of insurance premium
53 Id.
54 See TIM JENKINSON & ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, GOING PUBLIC: THE THEORY
AND EVIDENCE ON How COMPANIES RAISE EQUITY FINANCE 109 (2d ed. 2001) (1996)
("[N]early 6 percent of companies floated in the USA between 1988 and 1995 sub-
sequently were sued for violations relating to the IPO."); see also, Michelle Lowry
& Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 314-15
(2002) (describing the volume of IPO lawsuits in various years); Stephen J. Choi,
Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? 22-5
(NYU Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 03-04 2005), available at
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=558285 (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (discussing the
effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act on the number of claims
surrounding initial public offerings from 1990-1999).
55 See JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 109-14 (summarizing expla-
nations for underpricing based on lawsuit avoidance and their empirical support);
Patricia J. Hughes & Anjan V. Thakor, Litigation Risk, Intermediation, and the Under-
pricing of Initial Public Offerings, 5 REV. FIN. STuD. 709, 711-12 (1992) (elaborating
on the theoretical arguments and empirical studies that support the explanation
for underpricing based on lawsuit avoidance theories); Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of
Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 789-822 (1988) (developing
and testing the theory that underpricing is insurance against liability and the im-
pact on investment bankers). But see Janet C. Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance
Theory of Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 20-48
(1993) (arguing that the theory depends on incorrect or simplistic assumptions
about the law governing issuer and underwriter liability for IPOs); Phillip D.
Drake & Michael R. Vetsuypens, IPO Underpricing and Insurance Against Legal Li-
ability, 22 J. FIN. MGMT 64, 64-73 (1993) (providing further evidence that IPOs are
undervalued); Nagpumanand R. Prabhala & Manju Puri, How Does Underwriter
Price Support Affect IPOs?: Empirical Evidence, (Duke University, Fuqua School of
Business Working Paper, 1998), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=95948
(last visited Apr. 8, 2006) (providing empirical evidence that price support is re-
lated to IPO price risk).
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against claims. Furthermore, a higher rate of underpricing will
lead to a relatively low rate of legal claims.
As to the theoretical aspect of the above explanation, Alexander
argued against it, claiming that, in practice, the underwriters do
not bear the cost of the claim.56 Therefore, they have no incentive
to insure themselves by underpricing. Moreover, she claims that
the underpricing defense is irrelevant to claims based on security
laws anyway.
As to the empirical aspect, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist suggested
that the existing findings do not support this explanation of the
underpricing phenomenon. 7 Nevertheless, more recently, Lowry
and Shu did find empirical support, both for a higher rate of un-
derpricing in riskier IPOs, and for heavy underpricing leading to a
relatively low rate of legal claims. 58
The model presented here suggests an explanation for the
claim that the law plays a role in weakening the underpricing phe-
nomenon. I will assume the possibility that the managing under-
writer reduces the equilibrium price somewhat due to the risk of
reputation damage from investor misassessment of its effort and
professionalism (not necessarily following a suit). Underwriter li-
ability will increase the level of certainty regarding ex post moni-
toring of managing underwriter activities. Among other things,
the law sets forth detailed, mandatory standards for the managing
underwriter behavior, which will make it easier for investors to as-
sess managing underwriter compliance. The law also authorizes
the prosecution of managing underwriters for common law fraud
and misrepresentation in the civil law context. This increased cer-
tainty is sufficient for the managing underwriter to moderate the
underpricing rate.
Increasing certainty using the law is also important for estab-
lishing an intermediation mechanism based on managing under-
writer reputation. Since the law gives investors tools to examine
managing underwriter behavior, investor assessment of under-
writer reputation will be more accurate. In addition, the ability of
the various players to rely on the mechanism of intermediation and
56 Alexander, supra note 55, at 47-51.
57 JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 109-14.
58 Lowry & Shu, supra note 54, at 333.
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bridging of information gaps dependent on the managing under-
writer will be greater. From the managing underwriter's point of
view, the law reduces the risk of damage to reputation as a result
of investor error and allows action at a lower risk level.
2.2. Model Two: Underpricing Models
2.2.1. A review of the literature
In the bookbuilding method, the managing underwriter inter-
acts with prospective clients during the marketing phase.59 In the
road show, the managing underwriter presents the company to
prospective investors and receives indications, or informal bids, for
the amount and price of securities they expect to order. These in-
dications inform the underwriter about the way investors analyze
the information provided in the road show, as well as their own
private information. The information gleaned is used to determine
the offered securities' price and the way they are to be allotted to
investors. The investors giving these indications are usually so-
phisticated, regular clients. An unwritten agreement is made be-
tween the underwriter and the investors, which, after the prospec-
tus becomes effective and offers can be made, will be the basis of
distribution. The investors do not retract their informal bid and
the managing underwriter, in turn, rewards them in the allotment.
Henceforth, these investors will be called regular investors.
The financing literature discussed the bookbuilding method
mainly from the point of view of the IPO underpricing phenome-
non. This global phenomenon involves an increase in share value
in the first trading session, after having registered for trading in the
exchange, compared to their IPO evaluation.60 The mean IPO un-
derpricing rate in developed economies is greater than 15%, and
greater than 60% in developing economies.61
It is hard to underestimate this phenomenon. During 1980-
2001, the capital raised in IPOs in the United States reached a total
59 For a description of the bookbuilding method, see supra notes 12 and 14.
60 For an overview of IPO underpricing as a global phenomenon, see
JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 29-60. For an overview of the research
that estimates the underpricing rates in various countries, see id. at 24-27.
61 Id., at 37-38.
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of approximately $488 billion (in 2001 dollars).62 A total of more
than $66 billion of this amount was "left on the table." This total
was calculated by multiplying the number of securities allotted in
each IPO by the difference between the offering price and the clos-
ing price of the first trade session.
63
The cost of the primary market securities allotment mechanism
has been the focus of a considerable portion of the financing litera-
ture. In their review of the various models and empirical studies
seeking to explain the underpricing phenomenon, Jenkinson and
Ljungqvist split the models into three main categories: (1) asym-
metric information models, (2) models focused on institutional ex-
planations, and (3) models that take into account ownership and
control considerations by the issuing firms.64 Models falling under
the first two categories are most relevant to the parameters at issue
here.65
62 Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations,
57 J. FIN. 1795, 1795 (2002).
63 See id., at 1810-11 (reporting that "$66 billion was left on the table during
the Internet bubble").
64 For a review of theoretical and empirical studies on the underpricing phe-
nomenon, see JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 63-138 (discussing
asymmetric information models and institutional underpricing models); see also
Ritter & Welch, supra note 62, at 1802-16 (discussing theoretical explanations of
underpricing including theories based on asymmetric information, theories based
on symmetric information, and theories focusing on the allocation of shares). For
a review of possible reasons for the phenomenon, see also RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 414-16 (6th ed. 2000) (stat-
ing that many investment bankers and institutional investors believe that under-
pricing is in the interests of the issuing firm because "a low offering price on the
initial offer raises the price of the stock when it is subsequently traded in the mar-
ket and enhances the firm's ability to raise further capital."); STEPHEN A. Ross ET
AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 527-29 (4th ed. 1996) (proposing an explanation for why
underwriters underprice security issuances).
65 For a discussion of models in the third category, which take into account
considerations of ownership and issuing firm control, see JENKINSON &
LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 127-38 (discussing two opposing agency cost ap-
proach models to the underpricing phenomenon).
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2.2.2. Asymmetric information models
2.2.2.1. The agency problem in company-underwriter
transactions66
Baron and Holmstrnm propose models describing the problem
as an agency problem, where the agent or managing underwriter
has an advantage over the firm because it is familiar with the mar-
ket demand.67 The firm solves the lack-of-information problem by
delegating power to determine the IPO price to the managing un-
derwriter, as the more informed party. The problem is that the
managing underwriter has incentive to limit the IPO price to pro-
mote increased sales of the security, subject to the threshold price
the company is willing to accept.
2.2.2.2. Adverse selection68
Rock suggested a basic model describing the problem as an ad-
verse selection problem.69 According to this model, only the group
of informed investors has complete (private) information about the
company's value. The managing underwriter acts as a neutral
agent of the company, knows what the company knows, and
serves its interests. In the competition between the investors over
shares of IPOs, if the company is priced according to its "real"
66 For a review of models presenting the underpricing problem as an agency
problem see id. at 63-75 (discussing the winner's curse model).
67 See David P. Baron & Bengt Holmstrnm, The Investment Banking Contract for
New Issues Under Asymmetric Information: Delegation and the Incentive Problem, 35 J.
FIN. 1115 (1980) (characterizing the class of price response functions that the issuer
can induce the banker to choose under a delegation scheme and demonstrating
that delegating the price decision to the banker can be optimal); Baron, supra note
47, at 957-76 (presenting "a general model of a negotiated offering incorporating
the banker's informational advantage and the advising and distribution func-
tions").
68 For a review of models presenting the underpricing problem as an incen-
tive collapse problem, see JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 86-88 (dis-
cussing models that focus on potential agency problems between the investment
bank managing flotation and the issuing firm).
69 See Kevin Rock, Vhy New Issues are Underpriced, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 187
(1986) (presenting a model for the underpricing of initial public offering depend-
ent on the existence of "a group of investors whose information is superior to that
of the firm as well as that of other investors").
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value, informed investors will use their private information to
avoid "bad" investments. On the other hand, the non-informed
investors will "win" a larger share of "bad" IPOs. This is the
"winner's curse" phenomenon.70 In order to prevent non-informed
investors from exiting the market, the IPOs are underpriced com-
pared to the issuing companies' "real" value.
2.2.2.3. Other asymmetric information models
Booth, Smith, and Smith focus on what they dub the "certifica-
tion hypothesis," which suggests that the costs of asymmetric in-
formation about the issuing firm and the resulting underpriced
rate can be reduced by hiring a reputable underwriter. 71 Other
asymmetric information models focus on a firm's ability to use un-
derpricing to signal its true value.
72
2.2.2.4. Marketing and structural constraints (information
revelation theories)73
Benveniste and Spindt's model simulates the offering process
in the bookbuilding method, which relies on a two-way relation-
ship between the managing underwriter and investors. 74 Accord-
70 See Chowdhry & Sherman, The Winner's Curse and International Methods of
Allocating Initial Public Offerings, supra note 18 (discussing the winner's curse phe-
nomenon).
71 See James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and
the Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 261 (1986) (hypothesizing that "an
underwriter can be employed to 'certify' that the issue price is consistent with in-
side information about future earnings prospects of the firm"); Clifford W. Smith,
Jr., Investment Banking and the Capital Acquisition Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 10-12
(1986) (discussing information asymmetry and relative price effects).
72 See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Signaling by Underpricing in
the IPO Market, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 303, 304 (1989) (proposing a model that "provides
an explanation for the underpricing of IPOs as an equilibrium signal of firm qual-
ity."); Mark Grinblatt & Chuan Yang Hwang, Signaling and the Pricing of New Is-
sues, 44 J. FIN. 393, 394 (1989) (" [T]o overcome the asymmetric information prob-
lem, the issuer signals the true value of the firm by offering shares at a discount
and by retaining some of the shares of the new issue in his personal portfolio.").
73 For a review of underpricing models based on information revelation theo-
ries, see JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 88-107 (discussing information
revelation theories such as the Benveniste-Spindt model and other models that
extend from it).
74 See Benveniste & Spindt, supra note 17, at 343 (analyzing the bookbuilding
marketing process for IPOs). Additional models are based on Benveniste and
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ing to Benveniste and Spindt, this relationship allows the first
managing underwriter to provide investors with proprietary in-
formation about the company's value, receive the company's
"good" and "bad" information necessary for an "accurate" IPO
pricing, and reward them by underpricing the offering and allot-
ting them a relatively higher percentage of the securities offered.
The bookbuilding mechanism operates as a truth-telling verifica-
tion mechanism: if it reveals that investors have not been coopera-
tive by strategically nondisclosing real information, the managing
underwriter will erase them from their regular investor list.
2.2.3. Institutional explanations
2.2.3.1. Legal liability
As mentioned above, some models explain the underpricing
phenomenon in terms of attempts made by the firm and the un-
derwriter to defend themselves from possible lawsuits.75
2.2.3.2. Price support in the post-IPO market76
These models focus on the managing underwriter's role of
supporting the securities' price in the post-IPO market. In this
market, the managing underwriter can use the following tools to
reduce the risk entailed in the offering: (1) stabilization activities,77
Spindt's analysis. See, e.g., Benveniste & Busaba, supra note 17, at 384 (finding that
bookbuilding generates higher proceeds but exposes the issuer to greater uncer-
tainty); Sherman & Titman, supra note 17 (examining the bookbuilding method for
marketing IPOs); Sherman, supra note 19, at 1 (predicting that "offerings with
higher expected underpricing will have lower expected aftermarket volatility").
75 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
76 For a review of models presenting the underpricing problem as a price
support problem, see JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 115-21 (discussing
price support models).
77 The leader can flow bids at a price not higher than the offering price for a
certain period after trade begins, so long as the securities are still being distrib-
uted, in order to support this price (and so long as that option has been made ex-
plicit in the IPO prospectus). See Commission Guidance Regarding Prohibited
Conduct in Connection with IPO Allocations, 70 Fed. Reg. 19,672 (Apr. 13, 2005)
(final rule) (establishing prohibited conduct in security distributions and IPO allo-
cations); FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1013-18 (explaining the misappropria-
tion theory); IX SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 1, at 3988 (discussing back-
ground and disclosure requirements).
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(2) overselling offered securities when in a short position and cov-
ering the difference by over-allotting or buying securities in the
secondary market,78 and (3) penalty bids. 79 The managing under-
writer also acts as a market maker in the offerings it manages.
80
One of the primary explanations for underpricing according to
these models is that the managing underwriter uses those tools to
increase its own profits.81
The underpricing model presented here belongs to the group
that focuses on marketing and structural constraints, such as those
78 The managing underwriter usually has the so-called "green shoe" option
to purchase at the offering price up to 15% of the amount of securities issued by
the firm within thirty days of the offering date. FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at
341. Price-supporting actions used to be quite common and were carried out in
about half of the offerings between 1982 and 1983. See Daniel Asquith et al., Evi-
dence on Price Stabilization and Underpricing in Early IPO Returns, 53 J. FIN. 1759,
1764-69 (1998) (discussing tests of the mixture distribution hypothesis using the
period between 1982 and 1983).
79 The managing underwriter can deny a selling group member's right to re-
ceive a commission if the selling group member's customers rush to resell their
recently acquired securities (these investors are dubbed "flippers"), or can avoid
using that member's services in the future. See supra note 72.
80 Based on NASDAQ data in the post-offering period, the managing under-
writer acts as a market maker for about half the trade volume and accumulates an
average of 8% of the shares. See Katrina Ellis et al., When the Underwriter is the
Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in the IPO Aftermarket, 55 J. FIN. 1039,
1052 (2000).
81 For alternative explanations, see Reena Aggarwal, Stabilization Activities by
Underwriters after Initial Public Offerings, 55 J. FIN. 1075, 1075 (2000) (" [A]ftermarket
activities are less transparent and include stimulating demand through short cov-
ering and restricting supply by penalizing the flipping of shares."); Ellis et al., su-
pra note 80, at 1039 ("[T]he lead underwriter is always the dominant market
maker; he takes substantial inventory positions in the aftermarket trading, and co-
managers play a negligible role in aftermarket trading."); Raymond P. H. Fishe,
How Stock Flippers Affect IPO Pricing and Stabilization, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 319, 319 (2002) (presenting a model for how stock flippers affect IPO
pricing); Ekkehart Boehmer & Raymond P. H. Fishe, Do Underwriters Encourage
Stock Flipping? A New Explanation for the Underpricing of IPOs 1 (Sec. Exch. Comm.,
Working Paper, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=228434 (proposing an
underpricing theory based on the issuer's need for liquidity in the aftermarket);
Ekkehart Boehmer & Raymond P. H. Fishe, Underwriter Short Covering in the IPO
Aftermarket: A Clinical Study 1 (J. Corp. Fin., Working Paper, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=278945 (presenting a case study of underwriter trading
in the aftermarket of a recent IPO and concluding that the underwriter is able to
observe current order flow and use this information to lower its trading cost rela-
tive to other buyers) [hereinafter Boehmer & Fishe, Underwriting Short Covering].
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proposed by Benveniste and Spindt and Sherman and Titman.82
These models consider the issuing process in terms of two direc-
tions of information flow: (1) company data flowing to the manag-
ing underwriter and the investors and (2) demand data flowing
from the investors to the managing underwriter and the company.
However, unlike in other models, here the information given to the
managing underwriter is not detailed verbal information. In the
present model, the managing underwriter plots the demand curve
for the offered security by analyzing the bidding data it is pro-
vided with.
This model is based on empirical findings by Cornelli and Gol-
dreich who analyzed a relatively small sample of British IPOs us-
ing the bookbuilding process.83 Cornelli and Goldreich distin-
guished between three types of bids registered in the book: (1)
"limit bids" -the ordering of a certain amount of stock with a limit
price; (2) "step bids" -the ordering of a certain amount for a cer-
tain sum of money, and a smaller amount for a higher sum; and (3)
"strike bids"-the ordering of a specific amount for a specific
sum.84 Cornelli and Goldreich found that investors who provided
the managing underwriter with orders from which more precise
information may be gleaned about the investors' assessment of the
security's real price were rewarded with a higher allotment.85
Similar to Sherman and Titman's model, the present model recog-
nizes the importance of information gathering and analysis costs.
Unlike other models, it also recognizes that not all the regular in-
vestors approached by the managing underwriter for information
invest in gathering and analyzing information.
82 See Benveniste & Spindt, supra note 17, at 343 ("[Ilnvestment bankers use
indications of interest from their client investors to price and allocate new is-
sues."); Sherman & Titman, supra note 17 (examining the bookbuilding method
for marketing IPOs and the moral hazard problem faced by investors when
evaluation is costly).
83 See Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 17 (presenting one of the first studies
using bookbuilding records of a leading investment bank).
84 Id. For a study based on data from a different European investment bank,
see Tim Jenkinson & Howard Jones, Bids and Allocations in IPO Bookbuilding, (Ctr.
for Econ. and Pol. Res., Working Paper No. 3644, 2002), available at
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=363282 (concluding there is no preference for in-
vestors who have revealed valuable information).
85 Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 17, at 2337 ("[Tihe investment banker
awards more shares to bidders who provide information in their bids.")
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Various empirical studies have examined the underpricing
phenomenon and the reasons for it.86 These studies have not yet
suggested any single model that can provide a comprehensive an-
swer to the underpricing riddle, but they have shown that Ben-
veniste and Spindt's model, as well as those based on it, such as
Sherman and Titman's, offer relatively sound explanations for the
various phenomena involved in the IPO process.
87
Cornelli and Goldreich show that regular investors who have
made large orders have an advantage in terms of the relative
amount of securities allotted to them in an IPO over those who
make smaller orders. Such an advantage, albeit insignificant, is
also enjoyed by regular investors who make step bids over those
who make limit bids. Finally, a significant advantage is also en-
joyed by regular investors who make a step bid or a limit bid over
those making a strike bid.
Cornelli and Goldreich also find that among regular investors,
the more frequent ones enjoy an advantage over relatively infre-
quent ones, in terms of the amount of securities allotted in the
86 See generally Renna Aggarwal et al., Institutional Allocation in Initial Public
Offerings: Empirical Evidence, 57 J. FIN. 1421 (2002) (documenting a positive rela-
tionship between institutional allocation and the IPO returns on day one);
Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Under-
pricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 213 (1986) (describing the incen-
tives investment bankers have to enforce an underpricing equilibrium); Kathleen
Weiss Hanley & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Evidence on the Strategic Allocation of Initial
Public Offerings, 37 J. FIN. ECON. 239 (1995) (reporting that institutional investors
enjoy a favored status in underpricing offers); Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Under-
pricing of Initial Public Offering and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN.
EcoN. 231 (1993) (documenting the relationship between underpricing and the fi-
nal offer price); Shmuel Kandel et al., The Demand for Stocks: An Analysis of IPO
Auctions, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 227 (1999) (analyzing the demand schedule for 27 Is-
raeli IPOs); Philip J. Lee et al., IPO Underpricing Explanations: Implications from In-
vestor Application and Allocation Schedules 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 425
(1999) (studying IPOs in the Singapore stock exchange); Alexander P. Ljungqvist
& William J. Wilhelm, Jr., IPO Allocations: Discriminatory or Discretionary?, 65 J.
FIN. ECON. 167 (2002) (finding that allocation policies favor institutional investors
and promote price discovery in the IPO market); Roni Michaely & Wayne H.
Shaw, The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse Selection and Signaling
Theories, 7 REV. FIN. STUD. 279 (1994) (testing various underpricing empirical mod-
els); Tinic, supra note 55, at 789-93 (considering the possibility that underpricing
serves as a form of insurance)
87 See JENKINSON & LJUNGQviST, supra note 54, at 88-93 (analyzing the Ben-
veniste-Spindt Model).
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IPO.88 However, they offer no significant findings regarding par-
ticular types of orders. In fact, they show that the regular investors
tend to change their ordei type. They conclude that their findings
support Benveniste and Spindt's fundamental hypotheses, 3ince
they show a clear preference for regular investors, particularly
those who have better sources of information.
89
As for modeling the underpricing phenomenon, I believe that
the contradictory empirical findings and the models' different in-
terpretations reflect the multiple costs involved in the IPO process.
I believe they do not imply the existence of any single theoretical
model which represents the reasons for underpricing in a compre-
hensive manner. However, I do believe that the description by
Cornelli and Goldreich's and others -especially models describing
a two-way information flow, such as Benveniste and Spindt's and
those based on it-offer a good starting point for describing the
strategic behavior of players in the primary market. The model
presented below is based, in part, on these basic descriptions. This
is also true for the way the managing underwriter's strategic be-
havior in the post-IPO market is described in models and empirical
studies.
2.2.3.4. The multiple IPO costs argument
In general, several major transaction costs are involved in dis-
tributing securities in an IPO, which lead to underpricing, includ-
ing: (1) the cost of the firm's surplus information concerning value
and the firm's strategic behavior in providing this information to
the public to facilitate the investment decision-making process; (2)
the cost of surplus information held by the investors concerning
the firm's value and their strategic behavior in providing it to the
firm in order to determine the IPO terms; (3) the cost of surplus in-
formation held by the managing underwriter concerning the firm's
88 Comelli & Goldreich, supra note 17, at 2354-55.
89 Comelli and Goldreich found additional facts supporting their explana-
tion. In a subsequent study, they found that the underwriters determining the is-
suing price based on the price data in the bids received more than on order vol-
ume. Francesca Cornelli & David Goldreich, Bookbuilding: How Informative Is the
Order Book?, 58 J. FIN. 1415, 1427 (2003) (examining the effects of bookbuilding by
analyzing a sample of institutional bids submitted under the bookbuilding proce-
dure).
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value and its strategic behavior in passing it on from the firm to the
public and vice versa for the purpose of determining the IPO
terms; and (4) the managing underwriter's post-IPO market behav-
ior.
2.2.4. The players, their strategy set, and payoffs
2.2.4.1. The players
The players in the model are the firm, the managing under-
writer, and two types of investors -ordinary and regular.9 0 As in
the first model, the managing underwriter wishes to establish the
best reputation possible, and this reputation is very much depend-
ent on the public's post-IPO "analysis." In addition to its activities
to maximize its reputation value, the risk-neutral managing un-
derwriter also acts to maximize its own IPO profits, which depend
on the IPO marketing and distribution efforts and also on choices
regarding several parameters under its control, such as the IPO
structure and pricing. The IPO price (x) is determined based on
the supply (qo) and the demand (E[Q()]) data, which the managing
underwriter collects. By this time, the firm has already determined
the amount of securities to be offered, after having been advised by
the managing underwriter. The underwriter's estimate concerning
the demand curve of all the investors is based on informal orders
from regular investors. This estimated demand curve is dependent
on information collected up to the prospectus's effective date.
However, how does the managing underwriter receive the demand
data from the regular investors, and how is this processed into the
entire market's predicted demand curve?
The answer lies in the bookbuilding mechanism. The manag-
ing underwriter receives relevant data from the firm and performs
the due diligence procedure. After having submitted the first draft
prospectus to the SEC and checking and editing it, the managing
underwriter reports the data to the investors. The underwriter
presents the data to sophisticated investors, who are usually part
of its clientele, during the road show. These investors, which the
model refers to as "regular investors," reciprocate with informal
90 The assumptions related to the players are the same as in the first model,
presented in Section 2.1.2. with several changes to be discussed below.
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orders, indicating their estimated price or the likely amount to be
ordered. The managing underwriter processes these informal or-
ders into the regular investors' demand curve and into the market
demand curve.91
Ordinary investors (the public) are uninformed. They are risk-
neutral, and hold partial information about the firm's value distri-
bution derived from, among other things, the partial information
in the prospectus. In estimating the securities' real price (Si), they
act on the basis of two considerations. First, they determine their
degree of trust in the firm's disclosure and in the managing un-
derwriter's due diligence in assessing the information and present-
ing it properly in the draft prospectus. Second, they rely on esti-
mates by analysts, brokers, and other financial intermediaries (who
represent the public and act as agents translating the analysts' as-
sessments and marketing offerings). One can assume that these in-
91 The managing underwriter's expected profits depend on its forecasted
market demand curve, and may be represented by the following equation:
(1)En] L0 + jqo - EIQ(x)]) (S - xj
i ii
When the whole issue is sold (E[Q(x)] > qo), the first expression (i) represents the
underwriter's profits from the underwriting differential a, while the second (ii)
represents the added value the managing underwriter may obtain by overselling
the offering. The managing underwriter can satisfy the extra demand by buying
securities in the secondary market (or by using the over-allotment option, which
is not discussed here). If the managing underwriter chooses to oversell the issue,
he will profit if the secondary market price drops (S < x) and lose if the issue is
underpriced (S > x).
Theoretical and empirical studies on IPO underpricing used a variety of mod-
eling approaches, including diverse managing underwriter target functions. In
the present model, the managing underwriter's profits are presented in a way
similar to Fishe's presentation. See generally Fishe, supra note 81 (presenting a new
model for why IPOS are underpriced). On the other hand, most assumptions and
limitations of the present model differ from Fishe's.
A simplifying assumption of our model, which has no bearing on the results,
is that the managing underwriter allots: (1) a constant amount of securities (qm) to
each of the m ordinary (uninformed) investors whose bids it accepts; (2) another
constant amount of securities (qh) to each of the h regular and informed investors
in its clientele who have submitted accepted bids with complete information; and
(3) a final constant amount of securities (qj) to each of the j regular and unin-
formed investors in its clientele who've submitted accepted bids with partial in-
formation. Accordingly,
(2) hqh+jqj+mqm= Q(
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termediaries do not create a significant bias in the IPO price.
Regular investors differ from ordinary ones in that they are in
constant contact with potential underwriters who involve them in
the bookbuilding process. Not all investors have the privilege of
being approached by managing underwriters in the bookbuilding
process. To be included in that coveted list, the investor has to be:
(1) a financial intermediary of some kind (such as a mutual fund)
or an important customer of the managing underwriter; (2) finan-
cially capable; and (3) able to assess the value of firms for the pur-
pose of issuing their securities. 92 Those who meet those three con-
ditions will offer themselves to participate in the bookbuilding
process if this is included in their investment policy. Note that all
regular investors can become informed investors if they invest in
collecting and assessing the information.
A regular investor bears a constant cost (cj) even if he or she
does not invest in checking and assessing the information. This
cost derives from the need to maintain the due diligence system.
A regular investor wishing to become an informed investor and
participate in the bookbuilding process bears three main costs (Ch =
Cj+Ch,l+Ch,2): (1) the constant cost of maintaining the system (cj); (2)
the cost of checking any information received (by lawyers, ac-
countants, and experts in the company's areas of activity) (Ch,1); and
(3) the cost of assessing the securities by analysts, based on the in-
formation provided (Ch,2). We will assume that the maintenance
cost (cj) and the due diligence costs (Ch,j and Ch,2) are identical for all
regular investors.
I will further assume that the managing underwriter assesses
public demand data based on orders from regular investors, which
state the maximum price at which they are interested in ordering
securities in the IPO. According to Comelli and Goldreich's typol-
ogy, two types of bids meet this condition: step bids and limit
bids.93 The maximum price informs the managing underwriter
about the expected price of the securities offered. This is the most
important data gleaned out of those two types of bids, which are,
92 For description of regular investors' structure and methods of operation in
IPOs, see, Benveniste & Spindt, supra note 17; Comelli & Goldreich, supra note 17;
Sherman & Titman, supra note 17; Boehmer & Fishe, Underwriting Short Covering,
supra note 81.
93 See Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 17, at 2351.
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therefore, of similar value from the leader's point of view. I will
also assume that the third type, strike bids, informs the managing
underwriter about the regular investors' demand curve.
The research departments of regular investor firms select the
issuing firms to be assessed according to their areas of expertise,
their own customers' interests, or at random. According to an in-
formal agreement between the managing underwriter and the
regular investors selected, the regular investors will maintain a re-
search department so that it will be worthwhile to invest time and
resources into the analysis of a certain proportion of the offerings
suggested. Maintaining this proportion is not only crucial for the
managing underwriter, but is also efficient from the research de-
partments' perspective. It allows the regular investors to maintain
a certain ratio between the effort exerted by the investment de-
partment and the effort exerted between the research teams.
In fact, the managing underwriter selects its regular investors
in sufficient quantity and quality to ensure that a certain number of
investors will conduct the required analysis for each IPO. On the
one hand, this number must be high enough to allow it to conduct
a precise assessment of the IPO price. On the other hand, it must
not be too high because of the costs involved. Too many informed
investors will constrain the leader's maneuverability in distribut-
ing the securities.
2.2.4.2. The players' strategy set and the payoffs
It is assumed that regular investors approached by the manag-
ing underwriter may adopt the following strategies:
First, the investors may choose whether or not to participate in
the IPO. I assume that refusing to participate carries with it serious
sanctions by the managing underwriter, to the point of removing
the investor from the list of regular investors. Therefore, I believe
this strategy is irrational from the point of view of a regular inves-
tor trying to maintain its standing in the market.
Second, before examining whether investors will choose to in-
vest in information analysis, one must determine whether inves-
tors actually chose to invest at all.
Third, after deciding whether to invest in analyzing the infor-
mation, they may select one of the following options. The first op-
tion is if they do invest in analyzing the information, they may par-
ticipate in the IPO as informed investors. This means sharing all
their information about the securities' expected IPO value with the
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managing underwriter. Alternatively, they may choose not to par-
ticipate as informed investors, but as regular, uninformed inves-
tors. This means sharing only some of their expected demand data
with the managing underwriter. A second option is if they do not
invest in analyzing the information, they may participate as unin-
formed regular investors. This means sharing only partial infor-
mation about the expected demand. I will assume that investors
communicate demand data by submitting an order for a certain
amount (P). This amount is assumed to be valid as long as the
price of securities offered will be within the managing under-
writer's predetermined price range. Alternatively, they may par-
ticipate as informed investors, although they are not strictly so, by
submitting an order of the type submitted by informed investors
(which means communicating a guess about the expected value of
the securities offered to the managing underwriter). Such a strat-
egy may have dire consequences because the managing under-
writer may punish them severely should it find out that the infor-
mation has not been analyzed.
As opposed to withholding existing information, non-
investment is easily revealed through the lack of demand for in-
formation and the inability to conduct a meaningful discussion
about the IPO data with the underwriter. Moreover, if the regular
investor behavior with his customers indicates investment in in-
formation analysis (so that the managing underwriter does not ex-
pose any malpractice), his reputation may suffer and he might lose
both his status as a regular investor and his customer base. There-
fore, in practice, like the non-participation strategy, this strategy
(non-investment but communicating price data as if an investment
had been made) is irrational from the point of view of a regular in-
vestor wishing to maintain his status in the market.
Fourth, in conjunction with each of the above strategies, the
regular investors may choose between reporting their true data (on
price or demand) and reporting false data.
Regular investors receive a set of informal commitments from
the managing underwriter that guarantee them participation in the
IPO, whether as informed or uninformed investors. Most impor-
tantly, the informal set of commitments ensures normal profits in
the IPO in three ways:
First, the managing underwriter guarantees the informed in-
vestors' normal profit. In fact, this is a pseudo-commitment by the
managing underwriter to underprice the securities and choose a
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price and amount for the informed investors that balances their
costs. In return, the informed investors are required to report their
price data reliably. The informed investors are constantly under
threat of being removed from the managing underwriter's privi-
leged list of regular investors if they do not report data reliably or
if they fail to buy the amount at the price to which they have in-
formally committed.
Second, the managing underwriter guarantees normal profit to
the uninformed regular investors, at a level which will cover the
cost of maintaining the analysis system without actually operating
it at that certain IPO. In return, the uninformed investors will re-
port their demand data and keep their informal commitments to
the managing underwriter.
Finally, the managing underwriter also assures its regular in-
vestors that the amount allotted to them will be greater than that
allotted to non-regular investors (the public) participating in the
IPO. Otherwise, the regular investors may, at least in theory, pre-
fer to participate in IPOs as part of the general public and thus
benefit from the same underpricing discount without bearing the
costs of participating as regular investors.
2.2.5. The equilibrium: How the securities' price and allotment
are determined
The managing underwriter acts so as to maximize its expected
profits. It receives informal orders from the informed investors,
which are used to determine the IPO price (x), the number of regu-
lar, informed investors (h), the number of uninformed regular in-
vestors (j), and the number of ordinary investors (m) who will par-
ticipate in the offering. The managing underwriter also determines
how the securities are to be allotted amongst the three groups (qh,
qj, qm), subject to various constraints, including its commitment to
the informed investors to ensure profit by underpricing and a rela-
tively large allotment, as well as its commitment to the uninformed
investors to ensure profit and an allotment larger than the public's.
The equilibrium is determined to ensure underpricing. At
equilibrium, only some of the regular investors assess the value of
the offered securities, ensuring efficiency in plotting the market
demand curve. On the other hand, the managing underwriter's
strategic behavior prevents, at equilibrium, the creation of prohibi-
tively high costs of information analysis by regular investors. The
underwriter's ability to create an efficient equilibrium is dependent
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on its ability to reward informed investors by underpricing and by
allotting a large amount as compared to other regular investors.
The managing underwriter's ability to efficiently create an
equilibrium while minimizing analysis costs is achieved through
the process of plotting the market demand curve. This process has
two stages. First, the managing underwriter collects the informed,
regular investors' demand and price data (see Diagram 1.1). At the
same time, the uninformed regular investors report their demand
data, which are plotted as the uninformed investors' demand curve
(see Diagram 1.2). Combining the two curves produces the regular
investors' demand curve (see Diagram 1.3). Second, in order to ob-
tain the market demand curve, the managing underwriter extrapo-
lates the regular investors' demand curve, based on its experienced
judgment regarding the ratio between the regular investors' and
the ordinary investors' demand (see Diagram 1.4).
At equilibrium, both informed and uninformed investors re-
port their true collected data to the managing underwriter. An in-
formed investor, one who's invested in analyzing the information,
will report his price data and will not report demand data without
price data. That is, he will not present himself as an uninformed
investor, because if he does the managing underwriter will not
compensate him for all his costs. Such an investor also will not re-
port an incorrect (estimated) price. If he reports a lower price, the
effect on the IPO price will be negligent but will reduce his chances
to participate in the offering. He will also avoid reporting a higher
price, because independent of his chances to participate, no inves-
tor will buy offered securities at a price higher than their true (es-
timated) value.
The uninformed investors will report their demand data but
will not report price data. This is because a strategy of not invest-
ing in analysis but still participating in an IPO as informed inves-
tors entails a very high cost -greater than any potential profit. Fi-
nally, uninformed investors report true demand data, for reasons
similar to those of their informed counterparts.
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Diagram 1.1: The informed in-
vestors' demand curve
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Diagram 1.2: The uninformed
investor's demand curve
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Diagram 1.3: The regular inves- Diagram 1.4: The market demand
tors' demand curve curve
Diagram 1: These diagrams illustrate the process of plotting the regu-
lar investors' and the market's demand curve by the managing under-
writer.
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2.2.6. The role of the law
My description of the issuing process indicates that the most
important condition for the regular investors' participation in IPOs
is the managing underwriter's commitment to underprice so as to
compensate them for their participation costs. Moreover, the
bookbuilding mechanism creates an equilibrium at which the regu-
lar investors, having received appropriate participation incentives,
report true information. Here, the managing underwriter pays no
additional price to create incentives to be truthful. That such equi-
librium exists allows the managing underwriter to maintain an op-
timal investment rate using a strategy of keeping the regular inves-
tors' profits at a level constituting a disincentive for "defection," so
that investors who are supposed to invest in collecting and assess-
ing information will prefer doing so, and vice versa. The price
paid by the managing underwriter is that needed to ensure a cer-
tain ratio between the allotment to informed and uninformed regu-
lar investors. In certain cases, predetermining a certain ratio might
constrain the ability to ensure higher personal profits.
The cost structure described, which plays a critical role in the
model, depends on the applicable law. As mentioned before, the
primary market is characterized by high information costs. These
costs are reflected in a double hidden action problem, creating a
managing underwriter's moral hazard problem. The argument
presented in the first model, is that the law can play a role in solv-
ing this double problem by allowing the players to reveal how the
managing underwriter and company managers have conducted
themselves and by identifying the efficient market equilibrium (in
conjunction with its deterrence role).
Regular investors also deal with the twin problems of hidden
action and strategic behavior by the managing underwriter and
company managers. Regular investors adapt their organizational
structure and their process of assessing the value of securities of-
fered in the primary market to the intensity of this problem, which
is present in all IPOs. An institutional investor's reputation de-
pends on the accuracy of analyst publications and on his success
record. His profits also depend on his ability to form an accurate
assessment and to buy securities for himself and on behalf of his
clients at a price which is not higher than the real price.
Therefore, it is expected that without a liability rule allowing
ordinary investors to expose the managing underwriter's conduct,
regular investors will have to bear higher maintenance costs (cj). In
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addition, it is expected that in this case, the cost of analyzing the
information reported to the institutional investor (Ch,1) will also be
higher. Since the lack of a legal rule limits the investors' ability to
monitor the managing underwriter's conduct, institutional inves-
tors will also react by reducing their demand somewhat to reflect
higher risk.
The model suggest several improvements in efficiency to the
market allotment mechanism's as a result of applying a legal rule
that holds the managing underwriter liable for the existence of mis-
leading information in the IPO prospectus.
2.2.6.1. Lower costs of maintaining a due diligence system
When the legal rule holding the managing underwriter liable
for the existence of misleading information in the IPO prospectus is
applied, regular investors may rely on the firm's road show pres-
entations, thereby reducing the costs of maintaining their due dili-
gence system. Having the managing underwriter perform due
diligence is efficient from the primary market's point of view. The
managing underwriter will perform due diligence at the optimal
level required, ensuring optimal investment in information analy-
sis and avoiding redundant investment. Significantly, information
concerning the optimal degree of investment is held by the manag-
ing underwriter rather than by the regular investors. It is, there-
fore, reasonable to assume that the managing underwriter will be
the one to determine the optimal level of investment in due dili-
gence (and also carry it through).
2.2.6.2. Real demand
Regular investors will adjust their demand according to the
highest level of certainty once the legal rule is applied. Therefore,
in extrapolating the regular investors' demand curve from the mar-
ket demand curve, the managing underwriter will be able to calcu-
late a higher level of demand. This is due to increased demand by
the informed investors and to the fact that the extrapolation coeffi-
cients (the multipliers used in moving from the regular investors'
to the estimated market demand curve) will be higher. All these
lead to an equilibrium in which a higher price is systematically en-
sured for the offered securities, reflecting its complete estimated
value more accurately and thus reducing efficiency losses in the
primary market allotment mechanism.
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2.2.6.3 Possible reduction of indirect primary market costs
Given the liability rule, should the costs of maintaining the in-
formation analysis or due diligence system indeed be reduced
(lower cj or Ch), the managing underwriter will be better able to
meet the participation limits of the regular investors. However, the
managing underwriter will have to reduce the amount of securities
allotted both to informed and to uninformed investors (qj, qh), and
have a reduced underpricing rate. Thus, the legal rule is a poten-
tial means of reducing the underpricing rate in IPOs and, therefore,
of reducing the indirect costs of the market allotment mechanism
(even if the underpricing rate does not necessarily shrink). This re-
sult is dependent on actual reduction of the costs of maintaining
the information analysis or due diligence systems as a result of ap-
plying the liability rule.
2.3. The Law's Effect on the Managing Underwriter's Strategic
Post-IPO Market Behavior
In the post-IPO market, the managing underwriter's strategic
behavior affects the security trade in terms of the support it pro-
vides to maintain the offered securities' price. 94 The managing un-
derwriter's expected conduct in the secondary market also has an
effect, ex ante, on the conduct of the various players in the offering
stages.
The managing underwriter's policy of supporting the IPO price
is an important factor in the success of IPOs. It is believed that a
declared stabilization policy, acquiring the overallotment option
and stating a penalization policy, are vital tools in reducing the in-
vestors' perceived risk. But the managing underwriter uses these
tools to maximize its own profits; numerous scholars have found
that a considerable portion of the managing underwriter's profits
stems from its various activities in the post-IPO market (including
94 In this market, the managing underwriter can use various tools to reduce
the risk entailed in the offering, such as: (1) stabilization activities, (2) overselling
of offered securities (being in a short position) and covering the difference by ex-
ercising its right to overallot or by buying securities in the secondary market, and
(3) penalty bids. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64 (detailing the various
scenarios and options the leader may possess).
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its market maker role).95
Several studies have found that stabilization is not used in IPOs
to support the price.96 Instead, the managing underwriter prefers
the two other tools - overselling securities and penalizing selling
group members.97 Penalizing selling group members is limited to
cases of weak offerings in which the price drops after the initiation
of trade. Notably, an alternative to penalizing is withholding in-
formation about fast sales. Studies have also found that the man-
aging underwriter often oversells the offering. If the post-IPO
price goes up, the managing underwriter exercises the overallot-
ment option (and earns additional underwriting commissions).
The rest of the demand is met through buying securities in the
open market. If the price goes down, the managing underwriter
may choose between exercising the option and buying in the mar-
ket. It is worthwhile to exercise the option so long as the marginal
commission profits outweigh the loss attributed to buying at the
offering price, which is higher than the current market price.
Although various aspects of the offering process and the post-
IPO market are not fully explained, the models presented here elu-
cidate several major consequences of the managing underwriter's
strategic behavior.98 The managing underwriter acts according to a
calculation combining its IPO and post-IPO estimated profits. The
result can be a different equilibrium than that which would have
been obtained had it only considered maximizing its IPO profits.
One of the results of this combined consideration is that the man-
95 See generally Boehmer & Fishe, Underwriting Short Covering, supra note 81, at
2-4 (discussing the effects of underpricing on disclosure obligations); Ellis et al.,
supra note 80, at 2-4 (conducting a study illustrating how the leader can act as a
market maker); Fishe, supra note 81 (explaining the underpricing of IPOs).
96 See Aggarwal, supra note 81, at 1076 (arguing that overselling issues is pre-
ferred by leaders since it is a less dangerous tool from their point of view). An-
other important point is that in the case of overselling, as opposed to stabilization,
there is no comprehensive regulation, and the law even does not mandate prior
disclosure of that option in the prospectus. See also Ellis et al., supra note 80, at
1072-73 (examining the implications of when an underwriter is a market maker).
97 See generally Ellis et al., supra note 80, at 1053-62 (examining aftermarket
trading of underwriters in the two-month period after an IPO).
98 Other aspects of the offering process and the post-IPO market not covered
in detail include the bookbuilding process, determining issue price and securities
allotment, price support in the post-IPO market, and the effect of all these factors
on the underpricing rate.
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aging underwriter is not always capable of using underpricing to
optimally invest in collecting and evaluating information (as
shown in our model) in conjunction with an optimal rate of price
support activities. If a certain rate of underpricing is required to
ensure optimal investment in information analysis, it may be that
at equilibrium, the managing underwriter may find it worthwhile,
for example, to use a different rate in order to change the number
of "flippers" expected to participate in the IPO.
The effect of a law holding the managing underwriter liable for
disseminating misleading information is mainly relevant to moni-
toring subsequent conduct during the offering stages. Assuming
such a law reduces underpricing, we can see that it has a moderat-
ing effect when combined with the managing underwriter's secon-
dary market considerations. In other words, the law can reduce ef-
ficiency losses due to the managing underwriter's strategic
behavior, because it constrains the ability to profit by further in-
creasing the underpricing rate.
The managing underwriter's strategic behavior in the post-IPO
market is a basic indication of the possibility that part of the losses
in the market allotment mechanism are due to information gaps
about the managing underwriter's expected behavior. It is, there-
fore, advisable to carefully investigate the various costs entailed in
the managing underwriter's secondary market behavior, including
those derived from information gaps, and to consider ways of re-
ducing these costs by means of various rules, including disclosure
rules. 99
2.4. Overseeing Company Managers
Managing underwriter liability may reinforce company man-
agers' oversight mechanisms. In performing due diligence, the
managing underwriter scrutinizes various aspects of the com-
pany's activity that are sensitive to conflict of interests with the ex-
ecutives in charge of the IPO process. These include the way ex-
ecutives are appointed and discharged, compensation packages,
special personal interest agreements, executive power, etc. In addi-
99 For seminal research in this area, see Jonathan A. Shayne & Larry D. So-
derquist, Inefficiency in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 48 VAND. L. REV. 965,
976-86 (1995) (analyzing the effects of underpricing on pricing inefficiency).
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tion to addressing these issues in detail in the IPO prospectus, the
managing underwriter demands to adjust the compensation pack-
ages and the methods of approval. Moreover, it demands adjust-
ing the managers' powers and conduct in standard capital market
practices.
Since the company's interests conflict with those of the manag-
ers in charge of the IPO process, there is a need for a mechanism
that allows the managing underwriter to oversee managerial con-
duct in these matters. The due diligence process empowers the
managing underwriter to enforce standard practices. This power
only increases under a liability regime.100
2.5. Other Efficiency Considerations
In a study on imposing mandatory disclosure duties, Coffee fo-
cused on lowering the costs of collecting, verifying, and presenting
information to investors.101 He believes that a single system of
publicizing information minimizes the potential costs of several
overlapping information systems. It seems that managing under-
writer liability serves to reduce those overlapping costs by giving
the managing underwriter an incentive to carry out all activities it-
self -for example, to perform due diligence on behalf of the other
underwriters and to provide them with "comfort letters" attesting
to that fact.10 2
100 This argument is consistent with Coffee and Mahoney's justifications for
mandatory disclosure. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 27, at 737-47 (showing how the
absence of mandatory disclosure duties permits executives to report false infor-
mation or provide only partial information about positive projects in order to win
the added value in LBO transactions). According to Mahoney, the main objective
of the New Deal legislation is solving the agency problems resulting from conflict
of interests between the entrepreneurs and executives, on the one hand, and the
investors on the other. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to
Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1048 (1995) (presenting an "agency cost
model" as an alternative justification for mandatory disclosure requirements).
101 Coffee, supra note 27, at 723-37.
102 Comfort letters are used by the leader, the lawyers, and the accountants
who have carried out due diligence confirming that the various examinations re-
quired have been completed. These letters list those examinations and include the
authors' statements of findings. For different rules regarding comfort letter prac-
tice, see John S. D'Alimonte, Underwriting Arrangements and Documents (with Ex-
hibits), in SECURITIES OFFERINGS 2005: WHAT ISSUES & UNDERWRITERS' COUNSEL
NEED TO KNOW Now, at 773, 782 (PLI, Course Handbook Series No. 6361, 2005);
Norman D. Slonaker, Auditor Comfort Letters: Participation in Underwriter Due Dili-
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3. THE QUESTION OF DIRECTING BEHAVIOR: WELFARE
DISTRIBUTION ASPECTS
The two models presented here show that the law manages to
reduce the cost of the security allocation mechanism. It is hard to
point to an unequivocal standard which will show how the various
players benefit from the increased efficiency from holding under-
writers liable. The above analysis shows that liability increases ef-
ficiency, and that the managing underwriter can enjoy IPO profits
by strategically selecting its sequence of activities. It is also rea-
sonable to assume that the company -and even certain investors -
benefit from some of the resulting efficiencies.
As previously mentioned, the existence of liability rules and its
modeled effects on the primary market players, involves welfare
shifts between these players. 10 3 Thus, the company's benefit result-
ing from streamlining the executive oversight mechanisms (re-
quired due to conflicts of interests) increases in proportion to the
executives' reduced power, as a consequence of the managing un-
derwriter's empowerment. Thus, when selecting investors, the
company's interests may conflict with those of its executives. It
may be in the company's interest to ensure investment by a large
group of major institutional investors who tend to diversify their
holdings.104 The management, on the other hand, may prefer other
investors; for example, investment through wide public distribu-
tion and investment by a few affiliated institutional investors. This
is reminiscent of a managers' buyout deal ("MBO"), and thwarting
it is clearly in the company's interest.1 05 Allowing the managing
gence, in 37TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION, at 1219, 1222-28 (PLI,
Course Handbook Series No. 6063, 2005); Jeanne M. Campanelli & Peter Castellon,
The Mechanics of Rule 144a/Regulation S Underwritings, in NUTS & BOLTS OF
FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 2006, at 88-91 (PLI, Course Handbook Series No. 8392, 2006).
103 For references on welfare distribution and distributive justice and their
role in economic analysis of law, see supra note 26 and the accompanying text. For
a further discussion and analysis of the possible welfare shifts between partici-
pants in the primary market, see Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 583, 600 (2004). See also Benveniste & Spindt, supra note 17;
Sherman, supra note 19; Cornelli & Goldreich, supra note 17; Fishe, supra note 81;
Boehmer & Fishe, Underwriting Short Covering, supra note 81.
104 For basic theory of portfolio diversification, see Romano, infra note 120 the
accompanying text.
105 For a description of the study that investigated management buyouts us-
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underwriter to select the investors, supported by the liability rule,
changes the resulting holdings structure and makes it difficult for
executives to adopt this course of action. Yet, delegating executive
powers to the managing underwriter also means introducing an-
other interested party, with additional conflicts of interest.
Aspects of welfare shifts are also noticeable in the relationships
between the managing underwriter and the various types of inves-
tors. 106 Specifically, managing underwriters were criticized and
investigated for preferring their regular investors and discriminat-
ing against the public, especially in "hot offerings".1°7 In late 2002,
the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"),
and Elliot Spitzer, the New York State Attorney General, reached a
settlement agreement with ten big investment banks. Under this
agreement the investment banks must separate the security allot-
ment transactions from investment banking activities.
08  It is
doubtful, however, that this constitutes the appropriate settlement
of the "hot offerings" issue. The SEC, aware of this concern, re-
quested that the security exchanges appoint a committee to review
IPO procedures, including the practice of security allocation and
the roles played by issuers and underwriters in determining the
price of an IPO and bidding procedures. 0 9
ing initial public offerings ("MBO-IPO") to perform the deal, see B. S. Saadouni et
al., Unseasoned Equity Offerings MBO-IPOs vs. Non-MBO-IPOs, 23 J. Bus., FIN. &
AccT. 47 (1996).
106 See supra note 27 for information on welfare distribution and shifts.
107 For a description of those cases, see, for example, Diane Hess, N.Y. Attor-
ney General Requires More Disclosure From Merrill Lynch (Aug. 4, 2002),
http://www.thestreet.com/markets/taleofthestreet/10016329.html; Tamara Loo-
mis, Merrill Lynch Probe: Attorney General Claims Investors Were Misled, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 18, 2002, at 5.
108 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Ten of Nation's Top
Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Be-
tween Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
109 See, e.g., Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Chairman
Pitt Seeks Review of Initial Public Offering Process (Aug. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-127.htm. For further tasks made by regu-
lators to control different kinds of costs and market failures in the IPO's securities
allocation mechanism, see, for example, Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regu-
lation of Securities Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 45 (2004); Stephen J.
Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal, 113 YALE
L.J. 269 (2003); Ely R. Levy, The Law and Economics of IPO Favoritism and Regulatory
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The second model suggests that investors are not selected arbi-
trarily. From the distributive justice perspective, this has both ad-
vantages and disadvantages.11 0 Determining the number of regular
investors to participate in the IPO (and in offerings in general) is a
function of the information they are required to produce and the
cost of information production. Among these regular investors,
the managing underwriter selects a certain number of informed in-
vestors in order to perfect the strategy of producing optimal
amounts of information. It does so by allotting a certain amount of
securities and determining the underpricing rate to compensate
them for their services (analyzing the information and maintaining
the information system). Therefore, the bookbuilding allocation
mechanism should not be viewed as discriminatory. Regular in-
vestors are rewarded for their services, and managing underwrit-
ers have no incentive to pay more than what is necessary to main-
tain the mechanism. Furthermore, the institutional investors, who
purport to profit more than their ordinary counterparts, are invest-
ing the public's money. Thus, the public profits from the institu-
tional investors' success.
4. THE QUESTION OF DIRECTING BEHAVIOR: COMBINED
EFFICIENCY AND WELFARE DISTRIBUTION ASPECTS
As mentioned previously, a managing underwriter liability re-
gime serves to reduce allocation costs in several ways. Combining
distributive justice considerations is not an easy task. My discus-
sion's starting point requires an investigation of how the various
market players are affected by such a regime, but this suffers from
the lack of an unequivocal standard. An unequivocal standard
could show that market players profit from the increased efficiency
resulting from this process. However, if the conclusion presented
here is accepted, it is reasonable to assume that the company, the
managing underwriter, and the various investors all benefit from
this increased efficiency.
These results show that holding the managing underwriter li-
able is an appropriate course of action when the law's objective of
Spin, 33 Sw. U. L. REV. 185 (2004).
110 For references on welfare distribution and distributive justice and their
role in the economic analysis of law, see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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directing behavior is considered together with combined efficiency
and welfare distribution aspects.
5. THE QUESTION OF DAMAGE DISTRIBUTION AND INSURANCE
5.1. Efficiency Aspects
5.1.1. Factual description
In this section, I discuss efficiency and welfare distribution as-
pects related to the question of damage distribution and insurance
(risk spreading). This section begins by discussing the efficiency
aspects of imposing liability in order to distribute damages.
The primary market is characterized by a complex system of
distributing the harm inherent to the existence of misleading in-
formation in the IPO prospectus. It includes legally imposed liabil-
ity,1 ' contractual liability based on agreements between the vari-
ous participants in the offering process,1 2 insurance liability, and
market mechanisms. Insurance distributes risk by transferring it to
insurers and reinsurers for a premium. One of the most important
market mechanisms is portfolio diversification.
113
The liability circle of those participating in the offering process
includes all those contributing any details to the prospectus. These
include various experts who usually make sure they are protected
against the threat of legal liability by a professional liability policy.
111 See supra note 2.
112 In IPOs in the United States, underwriting agreements include standard
indemnification clauses comprising two major stipulations: (1) the company's (or
the selling shareholder's) commitment to indemnify underwriters for losses or
expenses due to misleading information in the registration statement; and (2) the
company's (or the selling shareholder's) exemption from this commitment in case
this misleading information has been included in the registration statement based
on written information reported by the underwriters to the company. In the
United States there is some controversy over the validity of defendant indemnifi-
cation and contractual contribution arrangements concerning lawsuits involving
securities regulation infringements. For discussions of these issues, see Cox ET AL.,
supra note 27, at 617-18; FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 1, at 1324-31; SECURITIES
REGULATION, supra note 1, at 46854701; Helen S. Scott, Resurrecting Indemnifica-
tion: Contribution Clauses in Underwriting Agreements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 223 (1986).
113 For basic theory of portfolio diversification, see references, Romano, infra
note 120 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the company representatives in charge of producing the pro-
spectus (usually those trusted with its daily management, such as
an active board member, CEO, and CFO) are covered by an officer
liability insurance policy. This policy is usually purchased for the
IPO, since no such legal exposure existed beforehand. Sometimes
the company also has a policy of indemnification in case of mis-
leading information in the prospectus, but this is implemented
only under unusual circumstances and is subject to strict legal limi-
tations. The company's lawyers, accountants, and those who write
the various opinions included in the prospectus, have separate pro-
fessional liability insurance policies. Directors are usually covered
in the officers' insurance policy purchased by the company's ex-
ecutives. The board as a whole, or individual directors who edit
the various drafts as part of their responsibilities, may add or omit
certain details. Such details may be included or excluded subject to
demands by the underwriters and their lawyers, accountants, and
various consultants. Details may even be requested by interest
holders who are not company officers. Underwriters may also
have a professional liability insurance policy. However, directors
and underwriters rarely contribute details to the prospectus and
are covered by separate liability insurance policies. Interest hold-
ers who are not company officers, much like other shareholders,
are not insured against a situation where they may be held liable
for the inclusion of misleading information in the prospectus.
In the United States, the issuing firm may be held strictly liable
for damages to investors due to misleading information in the pro-
spectus. 14 In the standard indemnification clause of underwriting
agreements, the firm indemnifies the underwriters for damages
caused by such misleading information. It also acquires an insur-
ance policy which will indemnify them against any expense or loss
included within the firm's indemnification commitment.
114 See supra note 2.
[Vol. 27:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss2/3
UNDER WRITERS' CIVIL LIABILITY
5.1.2. Added efficiency through managing underwriter liability
5.1.2.1. The managing underwriter as the least expensive
insurer and the underinsurance problem
The managing underwriter has an advantage relative to the
other IPO participants in that it is able to secure the best insurance
policy. Its substantial economy of scale and the fact that it is a re-
peat player in the market ensures its ability to reduce insurance
costs. It has the knowledge and ability to secure the best insurance
agreement with a potential insurer. Compared to most other par-
ticipants, the underwriter is not risk-averse, thanks to its large
capital base and the large number of offerings in which it partici-
pates. In addition, it has better bargaining capability with poten-
tial insurers and a reputation that can be relied on to reduce pre-
miums.
If the managing underwriter cannot be held liable, it will have
no incentive to insure against damages from including misleading
information in the IPO prospectus. Without liability, all the bene-
fits of insuring relevant professional risks will be reduced. From
the insurers' point of view, the risk management process is cheaper
when it is the managing underwriter, rather than the issuing firm
and its executives, that needs to be monitored.
5.1.2.2. High voluntary damage distribution costs
In order to make the most of the efficiency advantage involved
in voluntary contractual acceptance of liability, the managing un-
derwriter has to simultaneously conclude three complex and costly
transactions. This task may seem virtually impossible. The first
two tasks involve agreements with the investors and the insurance
company.115 In this agreement system, the managing underwriter
115 Here the discussion focuses on the possibility that the managing under-
writer purchases professional liability insurance for itself, independently of its
right to indemnification by the firm. Alternatively, the managing underwriter
could choose to self-insure the offering. However, I believe this argument is
partly relevant to the company's policy to guarantee its indemnification commit-
ment according to the standard underwriting agreement. This is because it is rea-
sonable to assume that the managing underwriter will actually conduct the trans-
action.
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must create an efficient contractual arrangement defining its pro-
fessional liability. This agreement must define what is to be
counted as a breach, how it is to be proven, and how liability is to
be distributed among the underwriter, the company, its managers,
and those who've composed various opinions in the prospectus.
In fact, the managing underwriter is required to create a contrac-
tual system mimicking the law. In particular, in order to deal with
the impossibility of evaluating, ex post, how the managing under-
writer has actually performed, the agreement system envisioned
here must ensure an efficient process of discovering, clarifying,
and interpreting the facts. The managing underwriter must also
include an agreement system that clarifies whether a breach has
indeed occurred. Moreover, the extent of damage caused will have
to be ascertained. Such a system cannot be established by private
organizations, since its costs are immense. Each interested party,
therefore, has an incentive to wait until the system is established
by others. Furthermore, it seems that establishing the system re-
quires large-scale coordination among the managing underwriters
in the market. Disclosure rules mandate a standard disclosure
format, and each managing underwriter will have to consider the
chance that, without coordination, its whole investment will be lost
due to a successful rule system created by a competitor. Such co-
ordination is, in fact, the role of the law. Finally, self-regulation
would not work in this area, as it would entail the high costs of
constraining competition and the negative externalities on market
operation.
The third transaction required by the managing underwriter in
such a case is with the issuing firm. The problem is that if a trans-
action in which the firm pays the managing underwriter a substan-
tial part of its additional expenses cannot be concluded, the manag-
ing underwriter will not buy liability insurance or undertake to
insure the investors.116
116 The following is a simplified numerical illustration of the argument:
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5.1.2.3. Damage distribution by the consortium
Although the law holds all underwriters in the consortium li-
able for the existence of misleading information in the prospectus,
due diligence is performed by the managing underwriter alone.
Historically, this practice was not legally mandated, but had sim-
ply predated legal liability because of various efficiency considera-
tions, such as the managing underwriter's economic risk, which
obliged the managing underwriter to perform due diligence.
Other underwriters do not perform due diligence themselves, but
rather rely on the managing underwriter to do so. Thus, holding
ordinary underwriters liable will not significantly change their in-
centive system or contribute to the efficiency of the due diligence
process; in fact, their involvement therein may be counterproduc-
tive. However, the law does create a mechanism of overseeing the
managing underwriter's hidden actions.
11 7
Holding consortium members liable is also used to distribute
damage more efficiently. Because the managing underwriter is a
large institutional investor who is simultaneously involved in mul-
Liability Issuing Firm's Leader's Added Return Added Social Added
Regime Insurance Cost Insurance Cost on Issue Utility Leader Profit
Firm and 4 0 5 5-1 = 4 1/2
executives
only
Leader 3 2 10 10-2-3 = 5 1-2 = -1
liability as
well
In this example, when the managing underwriter is liable, the firm saves on the
premium, the underwriters enjoy an increased income thanks to the improved
share value as a consequence of insurance, and the underwriters bear additional
policy costs. The managing underwriter buys insurance which is less expensive
than the firm's. While the overall cost of the insurance premium rises somewhat,
the price added to the share is substantial (due to managing underwriter liability),
and increases from a return of 5 to a return of 10 on the issue (the share price rises
from x+5 to x+10). Although the social utility of insurance increases significantly
(from 1 to 5), the managing underwriter's profits drop (since it receives 10% of the
issue profits but the cost of its own policy).
117 The standard practice, following the imposition of underwriter liability, is
for the managing underwriter to send comfort letters to the ordinary underwrit-
ers. As a condition for protection against liability for the existence of misleading
information in the prospectus, the ordinary underwriters must show that the
managing underwriter has complied with this standard practice.
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tiple IPOs, and because the market is centralized, there is a risk (al-
beit low) that a financial collapse of one managing underwriter
might severely damage the whole market.
5.1.2.4. Damage distribution by the managing underwriter's
deep pocket
Holding the managing underwriter liable also solves the
underinsurance problem that might be caused by a failure on the
part of the company and its managers to obtain adequate insur-
ance. If the policy is inapplicable for any reason, it is possible for
the managing underwriter to carry the liability burden. Impor-
tantly, the managing underwriter is also a "deep pocket", so that
holding it liable increases the investors' chances of being fully
compensated for their damages.
5.1.2.5. Insurance premium level
Multiple factors result from managing underwriter liability
that impair the efficiency of the damage distribution mechanism
through the damage distribution and insurance system described
herein. One such factor is the increase in issuing costs following
increased underwriters' premiums. Holding the managing un-
derwriter liable increases insurance expenses, and there is also an
added premium to indemnify the managing underwriter.
I believe, however, that together with this potential increase in
premium payments, there is also a chance to reduce them. As pre-
viously mentioned, the premium paid by the company to cover its
executives may be reduced thanks to risk sharing with the manag-
ing underwriter and its insurance coverage. But even more signifi-
cant is cost reduction created by the managing underwriter's incen-
tives to monitor company executives and to avoid liability.
5.1.2.6. The overinsurance problem and the advantage of
using reinsurers
Overinsurance results from overlapping and uncoordinated in-
surance systems. The main difficulty in this context is insuring the
liability of the various parties liable for details in the IPO prospec-
tus. Usually, there are two such policies: 1) the policy insuring the
company's active executives and directors, and 2) the policy insur-
ing the managing underwriter. In contrast, the liability of those
who have created any expert portions is focused on the details in
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those specific portions and not on the whole prospectus. 18 When
insurance is needed to cover the existence of misleading informa-
tion in the prospectus as a whole, the overlap between policies cre-
ates high costs. When the policies are of the same kind (that is,
professional liability policies, which exist when the law holds all
parties liable, including the managing underwriter), it is possible to
achieve some savings by buying the two policies from the same in-
surer or by selling them to reinsurers.
5.1.3. Are the investors the best distributors of IPO risk?
5.1.3.1. Risk distribution in the insurance markets and the
securitization trend.
According to Banoff, in security issuances in an efficient mar-
ket, the cost of due diligence required should underwriters be held
liable outweighs its benefits." 9 In her opinion, liability provides
additional insurance to the investors, which does not increase their
welfare, except perhaps when issuing new securities. This occurs
because investors diversify their portfolios, reducing the specific
risk involved in their securities, including the risk that their un-
derwriters would neglect to find misleading information in the IPO
prospectus. This argument was offered by Romano in the context
of IPOs.120 The question remains whether the argument and its
presentation are valid in general, and for IPOs in particular. 121
118 For general discussion on the section 11 liability of experts undersigned
on opinions attached to the prospectus see supra note 2. For a discussion of the
limitations on the expert liability for their specific opinions, see SECURIrIEs
REGULATION supra note 1, at 4256-57, note 146 and the references therein.
119 Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Regis-
tration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REv. 135, 158-60 (1984) (analyzing due
diligence in the issuing of securities).
120 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L. J. 2359, 2368 (1998) (describing investor diversification).
121 The assumption here is that the market is efficient enough to bring about a
reduction in specific risk similar to its reduction in the secondary market, but not
with the same degree of efficiency. In this context, "efficiency" means efficiency
of the semi-strong version, which is relative and more difficult to achieve than in
the secondary market. For empirical studies on the primary market's relative effi-
ciency, see, for example, Michelle H. Yetman, Accounting-Based Value Metrics and
the Informational Efficiency of IPO Early Market Prices 19-26 (Working Paper, 2001),
available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=296686.
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A recent phenomenon is the expanding circle of the insured in
liability insurance, especially in terms of professional liability
products.122 These policies are becoming increasingly specific.
One of the recently observed tendencies is that of avoiding finan-
cial intermediaries, with a concomitant trend of securities devel-
opment as substitutes for other instruments, known as securitiza-
tion, so that these are used, among other things, as substitutes for
insurance contracts.123
However, there are, as of yet, no financial instruments that can
be used as permanent substitutes for issuing risk insurance in gen-
eral, or for the insurance against misleading information in IPO
prospectuses in particular. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist view the
creation of securities, which play a role in the issuing mechanism,
as a potential future development in the issuing markets.124 They
believe that the beginnings of this development can be seen both in
academic studies and in practice. To illustrate their point, they de-
scribe the IPO of Shuttlesoft AG in Germany in 1999. There the in-
vestors were promised a refund of 50% of the issue price in case of
insolvency within five years of the issuing date. 25 This commit-
ment was guaranteed by a state-owned bank.
Doherty and Schlesinger investigated the parameters affecting
efficient use of securities as a substitute for insurance contracts and
suggested that the optimal distribution of risk is based on distin-
guishing between specific and systematic risks.126 For instance, if
these risk types could indeed be separated, the insured's efficient
strategy would be to insure the first component (specific) with an
ordinary insurance policy and the last component (systematic) us-
ing futures. 27
122 For a description of the phenomenon, see Mark A. Hofmann, Insurers are
Trying Harder to Develop Specialized Professional Liability Products, 30 Bus. INS. 13
(1996), and Neil A. Doherty & Harris Schlesinger, Insurance Contracts and Securiti-
zation, 69 J. RISK & INS. 45, 55-57 (2002).
123 See Doherty & Schlesinger, supra note 122, at 45. For a description of the
general trend of securitization, see, for example, THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY
OF MONEY AND FINANCE, supra note 8, at 433-35.
124 JENKINSON & LJUNGQVIST, supra note 54, at 204-06.
125 Id.
126 Doherty & Schlesinger, supra note 122, at 45-47.
127 Id.
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Insuring systematic losses may be impracticable in the insur-
ance market since the scope of this risk is tantamount to an impor-
tant portion of the whole market. Insurance through the stock
markets has the advantage of economy of size, particularly while
constituting a very small portion of the trade volume in capital
markets.12
8
When the insured cannot separate the two risk types, it is pos-
sible to secure optimal insurance through the insurer. Doherty and
Schlesinger demonstrated that in this case, optimal damage distri-
bution may be achieved by pooling individuals' systematic risk
components by shifting the risk to the insurance company and hav-
ing the insurance company insure the systematic risk by using fi-
nancial instruments in the capital markets.129
5.1.3.2. Risk distribution in capital markets
The question of how risks are distributed in capital markets
produced several different answers in financing theory literature.
One model suggested was the capital asset pricing model
("CAPM").30 Although heavily criticized, its basic insight that
adding a security to the market portfolio facilitates the distribution
of the new asset's specific risk but not that of the systematic risk, is
generally accepted.131
According to this model, when dealing with a specific risk in-
herent in the new security, it will be better distributed by the inves-
tors. This kind of risk involves the difficulty of assessing the ex-
ecutives' management skills or reliability. However, the systematic
risk inherent in the new security cannot be distributed by diversi-
fying the investors' portfolio. This type of risk can be distributed
128 For a description of this advantage of substitute insurance by means of
securities, see id. and J. David Cummins et al., Can Insurers Pay for 'The Big One?"
Measuring the Capacity of the Insurance Market to Respond to Catastrophic Losses, 26 J.
BANKING & FIN. 557, 558 (2002) (describing potential losses to insurers).
129 Doherty & Schlesinger, supra note 122, at 49-55.
130 For a presentation of the model and its various developments, see, for ex-
ample, ROBERT A. HAUGEN, MODERN INVESTMENT THEORY 201-35 (5th ed. 2001);
WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 227-55 (6th ed. 1999).
131 For empirical findings examining the validity of the model and its various
developments, see, for example, HAUGEN, supra note 130, at 236-54, and Stephen
C. Fan, Have We Misinterpreted CAPM for 40 years? A Theoretical Proof (Working
Paper, 2004), available at http://www.ssm.com/abstract=592167.
2006]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
by holding legally liable the player best able to internalize and shift
the risk. Such a risk is created when misleading information is in-
cluded in the prospectus as a consequence of inefficient prospectus
formulation or of an inefficient due diligence performance by the
managing underwriter. The law deals with this systematic risk by
imposing underwriter liability. The legal mechanism allows for
continuous review of prospectus formats and due diligence meth-
ods. Moreover, holding the managing underwriter liable obliges it
to carefully assess the risks entailed by liability from a strictly eco-
nomic point of view and to see whether and how to distribute
these risks.
It seems that the systematic risk cannot be insured by the inves-
tors even with the option of risk distribution through insurance.
No single investor has the information needed for proper risk as-
sessments. The company and its executives are also only partially
informed. Only the managing underwriter can perform this task
efficiently. Theoretically, the underwriter is able to choose to dis-
tribute the risk either through the stock market or through the in-
surance market. This article has suggested the potential benefits of
the first option; however, such financial instruments do not yet ex-
ist.
Assuming the specific and systematic risks cannot be fully
separated, and assuming it is indeed efficient to distribute specific
risk through investors and systemic risks through the managing
underwriter's liability insurance (including self-insurance), it is
preferable to hold the managing underwriter, rather than the in-
vestors, legally liable. This ensures optimal risk distribution since
the managing underwriter is best positioned to identify risks as ei-
ther specific or systematic and to distribute them separately. The
managing underwriter can also choose to insure the specific risk or
contractually assign it to the firm. Even if the law limits the man-
aging underwriter's ability to shift the risk back to the investors,
risk distribution by the managing underwriter will still offer a sub-
stantial advantage (despite efficiency losses by both the investors
and the managing underwriter, due to the twin specific risk distri-
bution mechanisms), because systematic risk distribution is only
possible if the managing underwriter is made liable. Therefore, it
is reasonable to assume that only the managing underwriter would
be able to insure all risks. In addition, there are various efficiency
advantages in terms of the managing underwriter's economy of
scale, the resolution of underinsurance problems, the high costs of
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contractual risk distribution and insurance, and the benefits of em-
ploying an underwriter consortium.
In light of the discussion above, it is clear that imposing an ad-
ditional cost of insurance against the specific risk is not unreason-
able.
5.2. Distribution of Welfare Aspects
As suggested in Section 4, it is true in the damage distribution
and insurance context that improving efficiency can be expected to
increase the managing underwriter's, company's, and executives'
welfare. 132 More efficient risk distribution by assigning risk par-
tially to the managing underwriter at lower costs, in addition to the
other advantages of such a liability regime, will likely benefit the
company and its executives. The greater certainty created by in-
suring against liability, in the event that misleading information is
found in the prospectus, the relative efficiency of insurance by the
managing underwriter, and the added insurance against system-
atic risks, will all be considered by investors as factors contributing
to a given security's value. Moreover, the managing underwriter
will receive a premium for performing its new legal role.
It is also reasonable to assume that if the managing under-
writer's risk distribution and insurance mechanism is more effi-
cient than a non-liability mechanism, it will improve the investors'
chances to be fully indemnified for their damages through the in-
surance mechanism (including the managing underwriter's self-
insurance). It will also increase their welfare (even though, as men-
tioned earlier, it is difficult to determine how the additional utility
is divided by the various players). Ordinary investors benefit from
risk distribution even more than their regular counterparts, simply
because they are more in need of the managing underwriter's risk
distribution services. 133
132 For an investigation of insurance's effects on social welfare, see, for exam-
ple, STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 186-281 (1987).
133 1 assume that institutional investors are not as risk averse as ordinary in-
vestors, that their portfolios are more diversified, and that they have a lower cost
of changing portfolio structure.
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5.3. Combined Efficiency and Welfare Distribution Aspects
As previously mentioned, a law holding the managing under-
writer liable is advantageous because the managing underwriter is
the least expensive insurer, particularly in distributing systematic
risks. It seems that, in reality, systematic and specific prospectus
risks cannot be completely separated. It is, therefore, the managing
underwriter alone who has the expertise, information, and econ-
omy of scale needed for efficient risk separation and distribution.
Moreover, managing underwriter liability will facilitate the resolu-
tion of underinsurance and the high costs of damages. Further-
more, risk distribution by way of agreement will enable utilization
of the managing underwriter's deep pockets, which, in turn, will
maximize the advantages of employing an underwriter consor-
tium.
As suggested in Section 4, a managing underwriter liability re-
gime offers efficiency advantages in the damages distribution and
insurance context, and it is reasonable to assume that the company,
the managing underwriter, and the various types of investors all
benefit from this added efficiency. 34
Based on this analysis, it seems that holding the managing un-
derwriter legally liable is an appropriate course of action.
6. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DIRECTING BEHAVIOR AND
THE DAMAGE DISTRIBUTION AND INSURANCE ARRANGEMENTS
The legal objectives of deterrence and damage distribution
sometimes conflict. In the context of managing underwriter liabil-
ity and damage distribution and insurance, if the specific and sys-
temic risks cannot be completely separated (as seems to be the
case), no such conflict emerges. I believe that holding the manag-
ing underwriter liable for both risk types is preferable in order to
optimally direct its behavior. One of the justifications for this sys-
tem is the lack of a mechanism separating specific and systemic
risk.
Another important aspect of the effect of damage distribution
through managing underwriter insurance has to do with the broad
issue of directing the managing underwriter's behavior. Adding
134 See discussion supra Section 5.2.
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an insurance company to cover its professional liability, and an-
other to issue the policy to the company so that it may meet its ob-
ligation to indemnify the managing underwriter, actually adds an
agency to oversee the latter's conduct. These insurance companies
are expected to be large organizations, specializing in IPO due dili-
gence, and their actions can play a significant role in directing
managing underwriter behavior. They are able to develop exper-
tise in the area of assessing the appropriateness because of their
size and the fact that they are able to compare the practices of the
same managing underwriter or of several managing underwriters
in multiple IPOs simultaneously. This is, in fact, the most effective
oversight since it is performed during the IPO process. This ability
allows the insurance companies to create their own databases and
make use of professional risk management, which improves the
due diligence performance mechanism.
Even if the law constrains the managing underwriter in assign-
ing the risk to the investors, there are still considerable efficiency
advantages in using the managing underwriter to diversify risks.
Among other reasons, if the managing underwriter is held liable,
the systematic risk is diversified. In such a case, in which the law
constrains risk assignment, the interaction between the means of
achieving the various objectives of tort law will change. Mainly,
insurer oversight of the managing underwriter will increase, while
the potential efficiency losses due to decreased deterrence incen-
tives (if such losses actually exist) will decrease.
7. CONCLUSION
The conclusions of both models presented in this article and the
various arguments raised have referred to various, hitherto unex-
amined, justifications for managing underwriter liability within the
torts economic analysis framework. The arguments raised herein
have two primary characteristics. First, they are derived from the
assumption that it is better for the law to support a market mecha-
nism and to intervene only to a degree necessary for refinement
without substituting market mechanisms. This applies equally to
the reliance on managing underwriter reputation, in view of its
various roles in the models presented herein, and also to the reli-
ance on the bookbuilding mechanism, which is the major security
issuing mechanism in the United States and is receiving growing
global popularity. Second, the arguments encourage the notion
that the managing underwriter acts strategically, within a complex
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set of options, in order to maximize its utility.
In sum, the conclusion derived from the various considerations
examined in this article is that holding the managing underwriter
liable in various IPO contexts will maximize economic welfare.
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